pledged immediate “mutual consultations” in the event of hostile acts against the signatory countries by a third party (publicly, the signers insisted that they did not have any specific third party in mind, but hardly anyone doubted that the description was aimed directly at Pakistan and, just slightly less directly, at China). Despite its vague wording, the article strongly implied that the promised “consultations” would inevitably lead to arms aid. India, said one observer. “wanted to make certain that she would have a supply of guns and ammunition if a war came."
Price: Bolstered by this reassuring prospect, India slipped into euphoric rejoicing. “This could be a new era for us,” rhapsodized one Indian official. “Japan became a great power because the Americans protected her and she didn't have to waste her resources on arming herself. The same might happen as we shelter under the Russian umbrella.” But should that be so. will India's policy of nonalignment be the price? Despite Mrs. Gandhi's public assurances that India's neutralist stance would not be affected by the new treaty, the fact remained that for the first time India and a major world power had come to an agreement on a treaty with distinct military overtones. “What is important is that India has always prided itself on being nonaligned,” observed a Western diplomat in New Delhi. “And now that the Russians have made this breakthrough, they might get a lot more new friends around here."
But clearly, Moscow is not interested solely in India's goodwill. As Gromyko himself suggested in a speech last week to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. China was a main reason for concluding, the Indo-Soviet treaty. In the opinion of Western diplomats in Moscow, the Russians were taken aback at the Ping Pong diplomacy between China and the U.S., and they were shocked by President Nixon's plans to visit Peking. It meant that all bets were off in Asia, and. it raised the prospect of Washington-Peking deals that could freeze out the Russians in a region that they have assiduously cultivated. Thus, by going to India's side in its hour of need, the Russians made their bid to become the dominant power on the subcontinent. Such a move, moreover, will probably help the Soviets to expand their naval penetration into the Indian Ocean.
Loser: With the Soviet Union the big winner last week, the U.S. was looking more and more like a loser. India was driven toward the Russian camp partly by the recent U.S. moves to improve its relations with China. Noting that Kissinger had stopped off in India last month before his secret mission to Peking, one New Delhi official complained: “We thought that he had come to the arca to look at the gravest crisis this subcontinent has faced since independence. He listened carefully to what we said. But all the time he had China on his mind. His very trip here was a ruse."
In addition, continuing U.S. aid and arms deliveries to Pakistan have stirred fury in India. “If you want to know why the treaty was signed,” said an Indian diplomat in Moscow. “I'll tell you: the Americans drove us to it with their arms shipments.” Indeed. India figures less importantly than Pakistan in current U.S. strategic calculations. But although the Nixon Administration has gone out of its way to stay on speaking terms with Yahya Khan, the Pakistani President is obviously not an attentive listener.
