| শিরোনাম | সূত্র | তারিখ |
| ১২৩। বাংলায় যুদ্ধ | নিউজ উইক | ৬ ডিসেম্বর, ১৯৭১ |
NEWSWEEK, DECEMBER 6. 1971
THE WAR IN BENGAL: INDIA ATTACKS
When nations go to war, they almost invariably claim to be acting out of the purest motives. Last week, as India's leaders met in the high-domed central hull of the New Delhi Parliament, there was much pious table-thumping and jingoistic rhetoric to justify an attack against Pakistan. “If we have to silence the Pak guns,” vowed Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram. “we are not going to stop at the border but go inside Pakistan. We do not care how far inside we have to go if it becomes a matter of our self-defense.” With that moral mandate thousands of Indian troops swarmed across the border into East Pakistan and the stage was set for a third round in the seemingly endless strife between the subcontinent's two arch-enemies.
Inexorably, the two nations appeared to be heading for a wholly unnecessary war. one for which each side would have to shoulder an equal share of guilt. Over the past nine months, the Pakistani Government of President Mohammed Yahya Khan had indiscriminately slaughtered more than a million of its subjects in a cruel and myopic attempt to prevent autonomy for the Bengalis of East Pakistan. And India, under the leadership of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, had launched a calculated campaign to dismember Pakistan, turn its eastern wing into the client state of Bangladesh and free itself of the burden of caring for nearly 10 million Bengali refugee, who had fled Yahya's reign of terror. As one diplomat in New Delhi cynically put it, “What was seen as a liability here a few months ago is now seen as an opportunity.” What made the steady drift toward war even more tragic was that the one man who undoubtedly could stop it- Bengali leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman-was being tried by Pakistan for treason, and Yahya Khan steadfastly refused to free him.
Worse still, none of” the world's major powers seemed able-or even very willing -10 extert the kind of influence that could stop the conflict. Despite Washington's $4 billion worth of assistance to Pakistan -aid largely designed to maintain leverage with Yahya Khan's government-the U.S. appeared powerless to sway the Pakistani leader. And the Soviet Union, notwithstanding its recently signed friendship treaty with India, had no better luck reining in Mrs. Gandhi. Thus unchecked, the rush to war was on, even though both countries had much to lose by it. “All good Moslems believe they will go to a better reward if they die in battle,” sighed a Western diplomat, “and Yahya may just want to go that way.” As for India, it seemed determined to risk plunging 20 per cent of the world's population into chaos in order to realize its longcherished hope of becoming the unchallenged power on the sub-continent and a giant to rival China for predominance in Asia.
The clash between India and Pakistan had been a long time coming. Like a pair of angry cats, the two armies had been circling and spitting at each other for months before
