পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (চতুর্দশ খণ্ড).pdf/৮১৯

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787 বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ চতুর্দশ খন্ড শিরোনাম সূত্র তারিখ ৩১১ স্টেটসম্যান পত্রিকার একটি দি ষ্টেটসম্যান ৫ জুন, ১৯৭১ সম্পাদকীয় THE STATESMAN, JUNE 5, 1971 KEEPING IT COOL When New Delhi decided that it had no alternative but to open India's borders to refugees from Bangladesh it did so on humanitarian grounds. This is a policy with which there can be no quarrel, especially since intractable circumstances dictated it. Yet such an indulgence in political generosity surely did not absolve it of the responsibility, in cooperation with the State Governments, of preparing for all foreseeable contingencies. The extent of the refugee influx, the hazards to health and security, the exploitation of these unfortunates by political parties, the limited capacity of the West Bengal administration, the strains on the economy both local and national, the dangers of communal tension and" the refugee invasion of Calcutta cityall these are matters that have not emerged overnight; they were and are inherent in the decision to throw open the borders and consequently could have been anticipated. On the question of whether or not the refugees should be dispersed outside the border States there has been a great deal of equivocation and a total absence, it would seem, of any coordination between the Centre and the West Bengal Government. All the circumstances combine to indicate that there is no alternative to dispersal but here again there is little evidence of a clear policy and a willingness to implement it. New Delhi's apparent reluctance to endorse dispersal is a reflection of its failure to persuade the States to extend the necessary hospitality. Thus we have in the border areas the ingredients of an explosive situation) with the West Bengal administration seemingly at the end of its short tether. A declaration of its own inadequacy is presumably to be the main theme of its discussions with the Prime Minister today; and that is a point which few will be inclined to dispute. The crisis with ramifications that are national and international is properly the concern of New Delhi. There is little prospect of the flow of refugees abating, the logistical problems of dispersal are becoming daily more complicated and tensions can be expected to multiply. The case for direct Central supervision is compelling as also for a policy of containing an explosive situation for which immediate solutions are not available. The primary concern is to avoid the worst consequences of an unavoidable situation. The myth of an early settlement in the region of six months hence should be seen as what it is: a species of wishful thinking highly damaging in a context where the worst should be foreseen and insured against in good time. On the level of all that is implied by relief nothing more can be done beyond what resources permit and this is a point which India's envoys, have doubtless been making with all the force at their command. It is on the political level, where the frustrations bred by the present dilemma become more demanding, that there is a danger of New Delhi being pressurized into actions that may win popular acclaim or satisfy emotional needs or take the wind out of Some parties' political sails but could be disastrous to the national interest. Whatever the