Pakistan's exports to Bangladesh which account for 40 % of their total exports. Industries which used to selling their wares at up to 100 % above world prices face ruin and a major economic recession threatens West Pakistan's business world. A 50 % price inflation is also anticipated within the next three months due to a fall in industrial output and imports. The foreign- exchange crunch has led to the abolition of the free list for imports; the complete ban on 47 items for import and the placement of licensed imports on cash- cum-bonus. In effect all imports are on bonus and a partial devaluation has already been carried through. The economic position of the country therefore makes the government highly vulnerable to economic pressures exercised by aid donors.
But to what end can pressures be used? The objective clearly lies in an end to military action as substitute for political discussion. Here negotiations can only take place with the leader and elected representatives of the people of Bangladesh. Attempts to resurrect discarded political hacks from the political grave dug for them at the recent polls not only makes the government an object of derision but clearly cannot deliver any sort of secure settlement.
Today the political leadership is still in the hands of the victors at the polls-the Awami League. Their leadership structure is intact and except for Mujib, physically present to conduct the government of Bangladesh. The Cabinet which presented itself to the world on April 17, 1971, consists of the entire party hierarchy. In collaboration with the civil administration who have withdrawn beyond the range of the Army guns. and sustained by the military strength of the Bangladesh liberation army, the government is attempting to establish a formal administrative structure and line of command in the rural areas of Bangladesh. The task is rendered difficult because of the novelty of the situation and formidable logistical problems but over a period this will provide the political and administrative infrastructure for the guerilla war which is being waged against the army and which can be sustained indefinitely.
This should not delude the world into believing that they can sit back and reserve their options. The longer the war goes on the more the present leadership and control structure is jeopardized. Today leadership is still in the hands of moderates who are sufficiently concerned about destroying the existing social and economic format of Bangladesh to opposc cven the blowing up of key bridges and vital economic installations as part of the tactics of resistance. Army terror, prolonged an pervastive. will compel extreme responses which will be less inhibited about destroying the existing social organisms as parts of the technique of waging total war against an occupation army. Ilistory provides too many lessons about the social consequences of prolonged war for this point to be reemphasized.
Yet another cost of inaction is likely to be the price in human life. The West Pakistan army is itself likely to raise its toll of Bengali life to the million mark. In the event of a military conclusion to the war the possibility of communal carnage through reprisals on Bengalis in the West wing and non-Bengalis in the East may add another million to the death toll, thus raising it to above two million. If we add the potential death toll from famine this could become one of history's major human tragedies,
