পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/২৮৫

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বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড

that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they progress. Dr. Kissinger asked that this be kept in mind.

 19. Mr. De Palma indicated that he did not yet know whether the Security Council would be convened in the afternoon or evening (this date). However, the first statements at the meeting would likely be those by the Indians and Paks. He suggested that Ambassador Bush should be one of the first speakers immediately following the presentation by the two contesting nations. He felt that the impact of our statement would be clearer if it were made early. Dr. Kissinger voiced no objections.

 20. Mr. De Palma asked whether we wanted to get others lined up with our resolution before we introduced it. This, however, would take time. Dr. Kissinger suggested rather than follow this course, we had better submit the resolution as quickly as possible, alone if necessary. According to Dr. Kissinger the only move left for us at the present time is to make clear our position relative to our greater strategy. Everyone knows how all this will came out and everyone knows that Indian will ultimately occupy East Pakistan. We must, therefore, make clear our position, table our resolution. We want a resolution which will be introduced with a speech by Ambassador Bush. If others desire to come along with us, fine; but in any event we will table the resolution with a speech by Ambassador Bush.

 21. Dr. Kissinger continued that it was important that we register our position. The exercise in the UN is likely to be an exercise in futility, inasmuch as the Soviets can be expected to veto. The UN itself will, in all probability, do little to terminate the war. He summarized the foregoing by saying that he assumed that our resolution in the UN will be introduced by a speech and there will be no delay. We will go along in general terms with reference to' political accommodation in East Pakistan but we will certainly not imply or suggest any specifics, such as the release of Mujib.

 22. Dr. Kissinger asked how long the Indians Could delay action in the Council? Mr. De Palma said they could make long speeches of question our purpose. Mr. Van Hollen said that they would draw out as long as possible which would allow them to concentrate on the situation in East Pakistan. Mr. De Palma said that they could shilly-shally for three or four days which, Mr. Helms stated, would be long enough for them to occupy East Pakistan. Mr. De Palma stated that we could always try to force a vote. Dr. Kissinger reiterated that there was no chance in getting anything useful in the UN.

 23. Mr. De Palma suggested that in all likelihood one side or the other will vote.

 24. Concerning the matter of economic aid, Dr. Kissinger stated that the President had directed that cutoff was to be directed at India only. He indicated, however, that he wanted to read the announcement to the President, so that the latter would know exactly what he might be getting into. At this point Mr. Williams asked whether some mention should be made in the statement explaining why aid for Pakistan is not being cut off. Dr. Kissinger said that information would be kept for background only.

 25. Mr. Williams said that the Department of Agriculture indicated that the price of