পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/২৯৪

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বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড

 12. Dr. Kissinger asked how India was handling next year's development loan program, to which Mr. Williams responded that nothing was under negotiation at the present time.

 13. Dr. Kissinger inquired about next year's [A.I.D.] budget. Mr. Williams stated that what goes into the budget did not represent a commitment. Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything into the budget for A.I.D. to India. It was not to be leaked that A.I.D. had put money in the budget for India, only to have the wicked White House take it out.

 14. Dr. Kissinger suggested that the key issue if the Indians turn on West Pakistan is Azad Kashmir. If the Indians smash the Pak air force and the armored forces we would have a deliberate Indian attempt to force the disintegration of Pakistan. The elimination of the Pak armored and air forces would make the Paks defenseless. It would turn West Pakistan into a client state. The possibility elicits a number of questions. Can we allow a U. S. ally to go down completely while we participate in a blockade? Can we allow the Indians to scare as of, believing that if U.S. supplies are needed they will not be provided?

 15. Mr. Sisco stated that if the situation were to evolve as Dr. Kissinger had indicated then, of course, there was serious risk to the ability of West Pakistan. Mr. Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their objective. He indicated that foreign Minister Singh told Ambassador Keating that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory- Mr. Sisco said it must also be kept in mind that Kashmir is really disputed territory.

 16. Mr. Helms then stated that earlier he had omitted mentioning that Madam Gandhi, whom referring to China, expressed the hope that there would be no Chinese intervention in the West. She said that the Soviets had cautioned her that the Chinese might rattle the sword in Ladakh but that the Soviets have promised to take appropriate counter-action if this should occur. Mr. Helms indicated that there was no Chinese built-up at this time but, nevertheless, even without a build-up they could “make motions and rattle the sword'.

 17. Turning then to the question of military support of Pakistan, Dr. Kissinger referred to an expression of interest by King Hussein relative to the provision of F 104s to Pakistan, and asked how we could get Jordan into a holding pattern to allow the President time to consider the issue Dr. Kissinger also asked whether we should attempt to convey to the Indians and the press that a major attack on West Pakistan would be considered in a very serious light by this country.

 18. Mr. Packard explained that we could not authorize the Jordanians to do anything that the U.S.G. could not do. If the U. S. G. could not give the 104's to Pakistan, we could not allow Jordan to do so. If third country had material that the U. S. G. did not have, that was one thing, but we could not allow Jordan to transfer the 104's unless we make a finding that the Paks, themselves, were eligible to purchase them from us directly.

 19. Dr. Kissinger suggested that If we had not cut the sale of arms to Pakistan the current problem would not exist. Mr. Packard agreed.

 20. Dr. Kissinger suggested that perhaps we never really analyzed what the real danger