বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড
was when we were turning off the arms to Pakistan.
21. Mr. Packard suggested that another consideration in the Jordan issue is that if Jordan delivers this equipment we would be expected to replace it. Ambassador Johnson stated we do not have any more M.A.P. left.
22. Dr. Kissinger states that what we may be witnessing is a situation wherein a country equipped and supported by the Soviets may be turning half of Pakistan in an impotent state and the other half into a vassel. We must consider what other countries may be thinking of our action.
23. Mr. Helms asked about our CENTO relationships with Pakistan. Ambassador Johnson stated we had no legal obligations towards Pakistan in the CENTO context. Dr. Kissinger agreed but added that neither did we have legal obligations toward India in 1962 when we formulated the air defense agreement. We must consider what would be the impact of the current situation in the larger complex of world affairs.
24, Dr. Kissinger said that we must look at the problem in terms of Security Council guarantees in the Mid-East and impact on other areas. We must look at the military supply situation. One could make a case, he argued, that we have done everything two weeks too late in the current situation.
25. Mr. Packard stated that perhaps the only satisfactory outcome would be for us to stand fast, with the expectation that the West Paks could hold their own.
26. Ambassador Johnson said that we must examine the possible effects that additional supplies for Pakistan might have. It could be that eight F 104's might not make any deference once the real war in the West starts they could be considered only as a token. If in fact, we were to move in West Pakistan we would be in a new ball game.
27. Ambassador Johnson said that one possibility would be our reply to Foreign Minister Singh, in which we could acknowledge the Indian pledge that they do not have territorial designs. He also stated we must also consider the fact that the Paks may themselves be trying to take Kashmir.
28. After discussing various possible commitments to both Pakistan and India, Mr. Packard stated that the overriding consideration is the practical problem of either doing something effective or doing nothing. If you don't win, don't get involved. If we were to attempt something it would have to be with a certainty that it would affect the outcome, Let's not get in if we know we are going to lose. Find some way to stay out.
29. Mr. Williams suggested that we might now focus efforts for a cease-fire in West Pakistan. Ambassador Johnson stated this might, however, stop the Paks from moving into Kashmir.
30. Dr. Kissinger asked for an assessment of the Pak capabilities and prospects in Kashmir. He asked C.I.A. to prepare an assessment of the international implications of Mrs. Gandhi's current moves. He indicated that we should develop an initial stand on the military supply question. He reiterated that he desired to keep Hussein in a 'holding pattern'
