enganders. Such factions are already present in East Pakistan, notably certain elements of the National Awami Party and the “Naxalites", an illegal West Bengali party with Maoist connections. The danger that these elements will take control of the rebellion if it continues unresolved for very long is much more than 50-50. You can picture for yourself the implications of a Maoist-led rebellion in East Pakistan.
So America's overwhelming concern must be to restore peace in Last Pakistan as promptly as possible. We cannot intervene nor should we even want to. But we have already seen that we are in a position in which we cannot avoid influencing the course of events. We should use our influence to work toward a compromise rather than military suppression. We can do this by refusing to finance the military operations.
I do not believe that neutrality obliges us to make our funds and resources available for prosecuting an internal war, funds and resources that can be used properly only for fostering economic development and defending the country against external aggressors. We ought to make it perfectly clear that our policy is that no American funds should be diverted from development purposes to military purposes. To this end we should attach effective safeguards to all future American disbursements in order to assure that they will not be used directly or indirectly to further the war effort. In addition, of course, we should discontinue military assistance forthwith. Of course we should nonetheless stand ready to provide food and medical relief to East Pakistan, where the disruption is virtually certain to cause a famine of serious proportions. Such relief also should be safeguarded against diversion to military purposes.
Those are the objectives that I strongly recommend that we pursue. I have not thought through the ways and means for attaining them. They probably entail a virtual cessation of commodity and program aid to Pakistan and a substantial restriction of project aid. The crucial difficulty is that almost any commodities or funds that we might provide to Pakistan for development purposes can be used to meet requirements for military support that otherwise would have to be met by foreign exchange purchases. So, in effect, giving development aid in such forms is an indirect way to finance the war effort. Any substantial reduction in development support would have unfortunate consequences, but continued development aid would be largely fruitless anyhow until a political settlement is reached and attention can once more be concentrated on economic development.
I believe that if this policy is followed the Government of Pakistan will be under irresistible pressure to seek a political settlement, and one that will assure to East Pakistan genuine equity in the pursuit of democracy and economic development. It would contribute to the stability of the entire continent, and be in everyone's interest.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to express my views
Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Dr. Dorfman, for a splendid statement, and for coming here today.
What kind of a political settlement do you visualize would be acceptable to the Government and to the people in Last Pakistan?
