পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/৬৬

উইকিসংকলন থেকে
এই পাতাটির মুদ্রণ সংশোধন করা প্রয়োজন।

ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড might be described as normal administration in East Pakistan will be slow and difficult, even after a political settlement. There is one issue on which I disagree with my Hon. Friend the Member for Kensington, North. I think that he exaggerates the ability of even an independent Government in East Pakistan to cope with the administrative and social problems which it is certain to inherit. One central fact about the way that this tragedy came about is that the Awami League which, as has been rightly said, received overwhelming support-167 out of 169 seats- was neither politically nor administratively prepared for secession or for independence, Indeed, if it had been, as General Chaudhuri, writing as a disinterested Indian observer, wrote the other day, the course of events might have been very different indeed. The situation which any Government would inherit now-a situation in which a large part of the police, a large part of the army, and a large number of civil servants in East Pakistan, have been killed-is one which is bound to tax the abilities even of groups of people far more experienced, skilled and prepared than the political leaders in East Pakistan are likely to be. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the central point is that the people of East Pakistan gave an overwhelming vote of confidence to the Awami League in the recent elections, and this cannot, and must not, be ignored by anyone concerned with a political settlement. I hope very much that the Pakistan Government will not put Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on trial. It seems to me that if they were to do that they would make any political settlement totally impossible. Worse than that, other leaders of the communities in East Pakistan would be bound to appear, Indeed, the destruction of the existing political elite in that territory would make any sort of peaceful settlement absolutely impossible. I hope that the Government will do what they can to present those considerations to the Pakistan Government. It seems to me that if there is to be progress, a far better act would be to release Sheikh Rahman and to invite him to accept responsibility for helping to solve the problem. My second point is that if there is not rapid progress towards a political settlement, the overwhelming probability is the collapse, for a very long time, of any sort of organized government and, indeed, in many respects, of organized society in East Pakistan. The anarchy that would attend such a collapse would be profoundly tragic and dangerous, not only for the people of East Pakistan or, indeed, of East and West Pakistan, but for the whole of the sub-continent. We know that stability is fragile in West Bengal, and one shudders to think of how infection might spread throughout that part of the world if there were a total collapse of government in East Pakistan. That leads me to my third point, which is the threat to peace. I do not think it can be denied that if there is not a rapid and early movement towards a re-stabilization of the