633 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড prospects. However, if this assessment turns out to be correct, then the total net quantity of food grains available in the province will be million tons less than in 1970/71 and 3 million tons less than in 1969/70. Two conclusions follow: First, and of immediate operational significance, 2 million tons of food grains will have to be imported in the period July–December 1971, including a carry-over of some 550.000 tons from 1970/71. If a daily supply of 15.4 oz. per person is to be maintained and total stocks kept at a reasonable level. Internal distribution of such a quantity will make extraordinary demands on the transport system and the administrative capacity of the province. Second given the possibility that imports of another 2 million tons may be required in the second half of 1971/72, a continuous watch will have to be kept over progress of the aman crop. 22. The picture who respect to jute varies considerably from district to district: however, acreage is widely reported to be down substantially. In addition during the fighting and the ensuing period of fear and uncertainty, weeding and thinning operations in many of the fields have been neglected. Fertilizer application, if it has occurred at all, has been minimal and cultivation has been spares. In many areas, the heavy early rains and neglect have led to considerable weed growth-and, in some areas (notably Mymensingh District), unusually heavy rains have caused waterlogging and further reduction of yields. Our overall judgment is that acreage is down by some 20% while the yield on that acreage will be down by a minimum of 10%. Applied to the 1970/71 target figure of 6.9 million bales, this composite reduction of 28% gives a crop of 5 million bales. Since there is no guarantee that cultivation will proceed normally from this point or that adequate labor will be available for harvesting and retting, this figure must be regarded as a maximum for raw jute. Even then, it is by no means certain that all of this reduced crop can be moved by the crippled transport system to mills and ports. 23. Until quite recently the situation in the tea gardens appeared to be surprisingly good. There was virtually no plucking during April and May-the first two months in the tea year-and that tea which was plucked was either not processed or badly processed. However, despite the surrounding border, the heavy fighting that has occurred in the area and the very high proportion of Hindus in the labor force, the bulk of the population appeared to be in place at the time of our visit and approximately two thirds of estate labor was present. Only half of field, factory and office staff were available for work by the first week of June while management (including assistant managers) was still largely absent but beginning to return in large numbers. 24. During the first ten days of June, however, two expatriate lea planters disappeared, and the second is reliably reported to have been murdered by the insurgents as part of a beginning campaign to dissuade expatriates-as well as localsfrom collaborating with the present Government in its efforts to restore "normalcy". As a result, and on the advice of the UK High Commission, those expatriate planters who were working in the gardens have now left Sylhet. 25.Without qualified management, it is most unlikely that tea production can go on efficiently. Probably it cannot occur at all. At the very least, therefore, production for April through July-or about 40 per cent of the normal annual output-will be substantially or completely lost. What happens thereafter will depend, firstly, upon whether security
