644 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড were possible to remove two formidable constraints and if the Government launched a comprehensive economic program designed actively to aid the recovery of the economy. 67. (i) The General Sense of Fear and Lack of Confidence on the Part of Most of the Population-The immediate manifestations of this fear and absence of confidence are the persistent failure or refusal to report for duty, which is particularly prevalent among the lower grades of civil servants and workers but is far from absent at the higher levels and the general hesitation of those who have returned to expose themselves either physically or in the realm of policies and ideas. Few are functioning properly. Officers are not in proper contact with those at the next higher or lower level of the administration and are not thinking imaginatively about, or working effectively to solve, the numerous serious problems confronting the economy. The effects are evident throughout the administration and the private sector, as, well as in the (lack of) interaction between the two and the result is recorded in the non-resumption of normal activity throughout the economy. 68. Furthermore, there are no signs that the situation will improve significantly or rapidly. Two dates-April 21 and June 15-were set by the Government for all workers to return to their jobs without prejudice. The second date has now passed, but people remain afraid and untrusting and it is most unlikely that economic pressures can or will be generated which are sufficiently strong to overcome this reserve. The normal urban/rural ratio in East Pakistan is such that those who have left the cities and towns and so far stayed away can be rather easily absorbed in the countryside, and there is no strong "pull" to entice low-wage and low salary workers back to the cities and towns-particularly to areas where large concentrations of the military exist. In addition, for many workers (e.g.) household servants and those engaged in the service trades) the demand has largely evaporated for the time being. 69. The only incentives which might come to bear with sufficient force are negative ones which may operate to reduce greatly the relative attractions of the rural areas. If the condition of fear in the countryside should come to exceed that in the cities or if there should be a general failure to solve the food problem, resulting in widespread starvation, workers and people generally might be forced back into the cities and towns in large numbers. But neither of these solutions is in any way desirable. 70. (ii) The Complete Dislocation of the Communications System.-This has been discussed at some length above. Its major manifestation is the almost complete absence of movement of people (except within towns) and of the exchange of goods between regions and sectors anywhere within the province. So long as it continues, this situation will exert a strong negative effect upon all efforts to revive the economy and to meet the basic needs of the population including, in particular, their food requirements. B. Minimum Remedial Measures 71. In setting the goals for normalization, the first objective must obviously be to avoid a catastrophe-large-scale hunger and starvation within East Pakistan and further massive movement of people out of the Province into India. The second objective must be to reactivate the economy on a comprehensive and sustainable basis. The question is how this process of normalization might be set in motion. As President Yahya Khan said in his speech on June 28. " normalcy in its accepted meaning can ne Ver return tO
