960 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড শিরোনাম সূত্র তারিখ পাকিস্তানী প্রতিনিধি মিঃ আগশাহীর বিবৃতি জাতিসংঘ ডকুমেন্টস ৬ ডিসেম্বর, ১৯৭১ STATEMENT BY MR. AG HA SHAHI, REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN December 6, 1971 It was not my intention to take the floor again, but the Ambassador of the Soviet Union addressed a direct question to me which arises out of the draft resolution contained in document S/10428, which he has circulated. This question was, why are you afraid of the expression of the Will of the people of East Pakistan? I believe that he is entitled to an answer and I shall give him an honest answer, but before I do that, I should like to make a comment or two on his draft resolution as explained by him. I draw the attention of the Security Council first to the fact that while the Soviet draft resolution attempts to merge the elements of the five-power draft resolution contained in document S/10425, it also changes that draft resolution which has been withdrawn. For example, compare operative paragraph one of the five-power draft resolution with operative paragraph 1 of the Soviet proposal. The five-power draft reads: "Calls upon the Governments concerned forthwith, as a first step, for an immediate cease-fire "The Soviet draft "Calls upon all parties concerned forthwith, as a first step, for an immediate cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities. . . . This is a basic change because, while one request is addressed to "the Governments concerned", the other is addressed to "all parties concerned". Since we know that the Secessionist elements are accompanying the Indian invading forces, the Soviet draft resolution would make them a party to this first step, compei us to negotiate with them and straightaway accord them the status of a party. In other words, it would pave the way for recognition. For us, as one of the parties, this is a most fundamental change introduced by the Representative of the Soviet Union. I shall respond to the appeal of Ambassador Malik to examine his draft resolution in the light of life and in the light of reality as it obtains now. There is an element of internal contradiction in the Soviet draft resolution. Operative paragraph 1 gives status and recognition to the auxiliary secessionist forces accompanying the Indian armed forces by making them a party. Operative paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft resolution calls for a political settlement, "giving immediate recognition to the Will of the East Pakistan population as expressed in the elections of December, 1970". The fact is, the reality is, that the auxiliary secessionist elements accompanying the invading Indian forces have repudiated the mandate. They stand for the creation of an independent Bangladesh State. That was not the Will of the population of East Pakistan as expressed in the-elections of December, 1970. There is a qualitative change in the demand that is now made. Therefore, the Soviet draft resolution on the one hand accords status to the secessionist elements who demand independence and who have repudiated the mandate of the people of East Pakistan as given in the elections, and on the other hand talks of "giving. . . . expression to the Will of the people of East Pakistan". In this situation, it is the auxiliary
