2500 yds away from the target in a forward assembly arca at 0100 hrs. Our troops were supposed to start crossing of the canal at 0200 hrs and to be in FUP (Forming up Place) which was on the flank of enemy main position. I had to guide all these coys upto canal bank and come back upto a vantage point where I was conducting the operation. To deceive the enemy and make him imagine that attack is coming from front I made a diversionary attach from the front with the help of a platoon. The platoon went very close to enemy position to the left side and opened up intermittently with their automatic weapons and other platoon weapons. Artillery shells of 75/24 also continued to shell their position at a slow rate of fire from 0300 hrs. This gave an impression to enemy that the attack is coming from the left while our crossing was going on from the right flank. Our troops were supposed to be a FUP at 0400 hrs. and attach to be carried out accordingly. For this 2 crossing points were selected. 4 small country boats for each crossing area was selected, for carrying out the crossing. In each side 2 cays to cross on the other side. Crossing site was selected at a flank where enemy neither had any troops, nor they could expect a crossing. Prc- H hour bombardment was very well planned to keep enemy's hand down and to deceive him. Wireless silence was supposed to be maintained till they come close to enemy's small arms firing range i.e. expected to be broken at 0415 hrs. I guided them upto canal site and after splitting the 2 groups cach of 2 coys I moved with my IIcad Quarter to a central location at a vantage point from where I could control the battle. Lt. Col. Zaman was left behind near the canal site opposite central position of enemy's defence from where we registered the target with the artillery guns. He called the artillery fire. Our medium morters (81mm) were brought as close to canal as possible so that they could fire at enemy effectively.
The night was unexpectedly foggy on that day and one could not see a person even 5 yds away properly. This lack of visibility really retarded the movement of our troops. We expected our troops to reach the objective in time and open up with their weapon when they reach within small arms range of enemy and that was 0415 hrs. It was already 0430 hrs and even became 0500 hrs. One of the task force i.e. A & B coys was Capt. Jahangir who was supposed to come from behind by enveloping the enemy. Other two coys C & B as a task force was supposed to be commanded by Lt. Qayum. As I was not hearing anything from them till 0400 hrs which was first to be broken by task force comd. I broke the wireless silence at 0430 hrs and started calling them by code name. There was no response at all. At 0510 hrs. I got Lt. Qayum in the wireless from whom what I gathered was that they were just moving from FUP to objective behind schedule by one hour and 10 minutes. The delay was due to sinking of 2 boats who could not take the freedom fighters across due to poor quality and the lack of knowledge on the part of troops about assault canal crossing. When I asked about the other task force in code word he could not give my any duc about them. However, I had some sigh of relief when I could get one group in the wireless set. He moved quite fast as the twilight was there, but the visibility remained very very poor. l'iring opened up at enemy at about 0530 hrs from the right flank. Enemy got quite perplexed as they were expecting an attach from the left at night. They came to forward position of the enemy at 0545 hrs and fought through. The enemy was so much surprised that they literally left the trenches and bunkers without giving