পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (দ্বিতীয় খণ্ড).pdf/১১৯

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92 বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ দ্বিতীয় খন্ড months prior to the expiry of the term, of the legislature which would end in a general election. This proposal, which came from an ardent parliamentarian, for securing fair and free elections, implies that a Prime Minister who has held office for over four years cannot be trusted to act honestly just preceding the elections. If that be so, how can one rely on him to act honesty in the earlier part of his tenure whenever his position is threatened. If, at the close of his tenure, his desire, to get re-elected and also to facilitate the re-election of his party, is going to lead him away from the path of rectitude, there would be nothing preventing him, even at an earlier stage to act dishonestly whenever danger to his position arises. As regards the period during which the President is to be in charge of the entire administration, it has to be borne in mind that, according to this proposal, there would be no legislature to restrain him during that period. The question, therefore, arises: what is to be done should the President, after taking over the entire administration, feel tempted to continue as the sole ruler for a period longer than three months? It was, no doubt, proposed by the same ardent parliamentarian that, to avoid such a contingency, it should be provided in the constitution that the President can hold office only for one term and, thereafter, he should retire from active life in lieu of an adequate pension. We think that it is very difficult to secure a person to hold office just for a term of four or five years and then to disappear from active life altogether. In this connection, it is convenient to consider the opinion expressed by some of the presidentialists that in our country if there are two persons at the head of affairs, one as the constitutional head and the other as the actual head of the executive, there is bound to be a clash between them. In our opinion, there is considerable force in this view. What is required for the successful working of the parliamentary form of government is an impartial head of the state, who keeps himself above party politics, but an elected head of the state is hardly likely to remain aloof. The well-known Labor leader, Herbert Morrison,' in his. "Government and Parliament", while dealing with the question whether the head of the state in England should be the hereditary sovereign or an elected President, points OUÍ: "Popular election would give the President too much authority at the expense of the Government and Parliament. In any case there would be every possibility of friction and party bargaining of the kind seen in the election of the French President in 1953." It is remarkable that British parliamentary form has worked well in the monarchical countries in Europe, while, in the republics of Europe where it was adopted, it has undergone a change. A constitutional monarch is trained to play the role of an impartial head of the state and, as far as his position and privileges are concerned, they are above controversy as he is the first citizen and this position continues till he either abdicates or dies. An elected head of the state must naturally be a person who commands the confidence of the people, and if he happens to be a strong person and the Prime Minister, who equally should have the confidence of the people, is also equally strong, clashes between them, particularly in a country like ours, where the sense of political responsibility has yet to be developed fully, are bound to occur. Our past political history, short as it is, bears this out. As long as either the Prime Minister or the Governor-General was not a strong personality, there was only one person, for all practical purposes, at the

  • p. 88.