unitary form of government. In the same strain, it was proposed that there should be ministers appointed for the province but that their appointment should also be made by the President and not by the Governor.
66. Having given our anxious consideration to the above proposal, we find ourselves unable to recommend it. In our opinion, this scheme, besides creating difficulties, is the surest way of making the central legislature provincial minded. What is required for the progress of our country is the inculcation of the habit of considering every question from a national point of view. This would need the members of the central legislature to be trained to look at Questions affecting the country from the point of view of the whole of Pakistan. That being so if, for nearly half of the year, each half of the parliament, instead of continuing to deal throughout with subjects of allPakistan importance, has go back to the respective provinces to deal with provincial matters, what hope can there be of ever developing an All-Pakistan point of view? The result of these persons acting in the regional committees would be that, in course of time, everything they handle would be approached from the provincial angle. Apart from this, in the practical working of the scheme, there will be difficulties. For instance, if these regional committees have already legislated on any of the items of the Concurrent List and nullified even the veto by reiterating the legislation by a twothirds majority, and it is considered by the President that the Centre should then legislate on that very subject, or in a cognate matter, the said committees, who have already committed themselves to one point of view, are least likely to change their mind and legislate to a different effect. When this aspect of the matter was put to the official delegation, the answer received by the Commission was that the provincial committees would not pass all measures unanimously, and that, if they pass a measure unanimously, the Centre should not venture to legislate again. But even if the local committees are not unanimous, they would at least have been in a majority and. if so, the minorities of the two committees cannot constitute a sufficient majority, when sitting together in the Parliament to pass a different legislation. We are unable to understand the position that, if the provincial legislation has been passed unanimously, the Centre should not venture to legislate. If the Centre wants to legislate contrary to the provincial legislation, it must be because it considers such a course necessary in the interests of the country as a whole. We fail to see why we should adopt a system which could, under such circumstances, render the Centre helpless.
67. The establishment of the provincial committees, it was stated, would save expense and time. Separate provincial legislatures were objected to on the ground that they would give the people of the province an opportunity of criticizing the Central Government, without justification, mcrcly on provincial prejudice. We have considered these aspects very carefully. As far as expense is concerned, a democratic form of government is certainly more expensive than an autocratic one, and on the ground of expenditure alone we cannot refuse to have a legislature. But in this case, there will be no saving of expense or time by the system of local committees, for the members of the Parliament would be wholly occupied, either in the Parliament with central legislation or in the provincial committees with provincial legislation and, wherever they may be they will have to be paid. From this point of view, separate legislatures will not be costlier than the provincial committees. But the more serious objection is what we have already
