পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (দ্বিতীয় খণ্ড).pdf/৮৬৭

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এই পাতাটির মুদ্রণ সংশোধন করা প্রয়োজন।

840 বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ দ্বিতীয় খন্ড commission in protest, and the army is faced with the embarrassment of deciding whether to court martial one of its most distinguished generals. Yakub's replacement was backed up by a continuous inflow of reinforcements for the garrisons. Yahya in a speech on March 5 had given further provocation by blaming Mujib for the crisis and not even alluding to Bhutto. His offer to reconvene the Assembly on March 25 was seen as belated and inadequate and as having been put in a context in which it was rendered virtually irrelevant. For this reason it was believed by many that Mujib would use his public meeting of March 7 to proclaim independence, since Yahya had shown no willingness to come to terms with the consequences of his earlier decision. The army itself was put on full alert to go into action on March 7 in the event of such a declaration. Mujib realized that any such proclamation would invoke massive carnage on Bengalis, and was reluctant to assume such a responsibility. His decision to preserve with non-cooperation while leaving the door open for a negotiated settlement within Pakistan was a compromise between the counter-pressures of the street and the army. There is no doubt that between March 1 and 7 he was under intense pressure to proclaim independence, and this became greater still after Yahya's broadcast on March 6. But by the afternoon of March 7 the had successfully contained these pressures and committed his party to negotiations within the framework of Pakistan. ..Subsequent suggestions that he lost control to extremist elements in his party bear no relation to the facts, and overlook the point that the crucial issue had been resolved before March 7, after which Mujib's authority on ail substantive issues was unchallenged within the party. When, for instance, student leaders decided unilaterally to impose a customs check on West Pakistanis leaving Dacca it took Mujib precisely four hours to get this withdrawn. It was largely the unchallenged nature of his authority which enabled him to use his volunteers to preserve law and order throughout the province during this period. Given the changed atmosphere this was no mean achievement. It can be confirmed by a host of foreign journalists who had congregated in Dacca hoping to witness a major convulsion. The-President Comes to Negotiate Denied the provocation of a UDI, or even the breakdown of law and order, Yahya seems to have opted for negotiations. He arrived in Dacca on March 15 with Generals Peerzada and Umer in his entourage. It has since been learnt that several other members of the junta had arrived less conspicuously and were staying out of sight in the cantonment. Yahya began talks with Mujib within a day of his arrival. Mujib had table his four demands, which were : ! Withdrawal of Martial Law. 2. Transfer of power to the elected representatives. 3. Withdrawal of troops to the cantonment and cessation of reinforcements. 4 An inquiry into army firing on March 2 and 3.