decision not to attend the ensuing session of the National Assembly was unshakeable and irrevocable."
On 17 February, Bhutto stated in Karachi that “under present circumstances, it was pointless for the people's party to attend the ensuing National Assembly session."Bhutto said that his party had tried its best to work out some agreed settlement and understanding with Awami League but now “there is no room for further negotiations with the Awami League."Of the six-points of the Awami League, Bhutto stated that “the most difficult was the one pertaining to foreign trade and foreign aid."
Thus Bhutto's statement showed a clear hardening of his position and in contrast to the statement made by him at the end of January in Dacca, when he had stated that further negotiations would be conducted with Awami League and that such negotiations could be held even within the National Assembly. Instead, there was now a refusal to come to the National Assembly and an assertion that there was no room for further negotiations with the Awami League.
The apprehension of the Bengalis that the position of the military junta or at least a section of the junta, was hardening and that Bhutto may be linked with them, was reflected in a question put to Bhutto by the press which prompted Bhutto to deny that his party's decision not to attend the Assembly did not have any blessings from the present regime. He said that there was no question of any agreement “behind the scenes” between him and anybody clsc. That this apprehension, and the question put by the press, was well founded appears from a recent account from one of Yahya's advisers, who writes that by the middle of February:
Bhutto, by this time, knew his bargaining strength; powerful members of the junta were with him rather than with Yahya. As pointed out earlier. Yahya had a free hand in formulating a scheme for the transfer of power and holding elections, but the junta adopted a policy of 'wait and see'; if Yahya was successful in maintaining the unity of the country by whatever constitutional devices, well and good, but from late January when Yahya had his abortive talks with Mujib, the junta was not prepared to remain as a passive spectator of the political and constitutional issues. From January, the process of decision-making changed...it is my assumption that in February, like Ahsan, Yahya might also have been replaced by Hamid; he would not perhaps have been unhappy to go, but for some reasons the junta had to carry on with Yahya, so Yahya continued play his role on an untenable situation.
In the third week of February an atmosphere of crisis prevailed. Around 19 February, military movements were noticed in Dacca and a machine gun nest appeared in the mound in front of the National Assembly building in Dacca. This led Sheikh Mujibur gently to summon party leaders to a meeting to review this development. Some of the student leaders were also present at the meeting. I was present at this meeting, where reports were brought that a great deal of activity was noticed to the Cantonment and there was apprehension that some military action was in the offing. F'aced with this situation, it was apprehension that some military action was in the offing. Faced with this situation, it was felt that no one should stay in his house that night and in the event of a military operation being launched, everyone was to leave Dacca and to mobilize the people in the
