It is not correct as stated in the Pakistan Government White Paper that on March 17, a martial Law Regulation had already been drafted providing for setting up of Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governors of the Provinces or that such a regulation had provided for the Martial Law to recede into the background. The discussion, in fact, were exploratory and most of the time was spent in going over the ground relating to the question of legal vacuum which according to Cornelius and Peerzada would occur if Martial Law were to be revoked before a Constitution was adopted. The counter-argument was put that an Interim Arrangements Order could be brought into force by a Proclamation, which would provide the bridge between the withdrawals the withdrawal of Martial Law and the adoption of a Constitution.
It is now on record that following the meeting of March 17 Yahya khan asked General Tikka khan to “get ready” and, accordingly, on the morning of March 18, Major-Generals Khadim Husain Raja and Rao Farman Ali prepared the blueprint for Operation Searchlight-the codename given to the plan for a military crackdown all over the province to be effective on March 25.
On the morning of 19 March, Sheikh Mujib had another meeting with Yahya and emphasized that that the only solution was for withdrawal of Martial Law and transfer of power to the elected representatives. An Interim Arrangements Order could be in force during the interim period. Such an Order could be made by a Presidential Proclamation. The same evening Yahya's Advisers sat with the Awami League team.
It is not correct as the Pakistan Government While paper states, that the President's team had provided a Martial Law regulation to meet the demands of the Awami League “as far as was legally possible."
There was no indication of the existence of many such Martial Law Regulation having been drafted. Indeed, the following morning a good deal of time was taken up over the argument as to the legal vacuum and it was only, thereafter, that the question of drafting of any Instrument at all came up in the discussion.
On the morning of 20 March, Sheikh Mujib met Yahya. On this occasion Sheikh Mujib took with him Syed Nazrul Islam, Tajuddin Ahmed, Capt. Mansoor Ali, Khandaker Mushtaq Ahmed, A H M Kamruzzaman and myself. On Yahya's side, Peerzada, Cornelius and Col. Hassan were present.
On the previous day, while army trucks had been passing through Tongi, they had been attacked by the people, and an exchange of fire between the army and the people had taken place. Indeed, it was one of the first instances of the people having offered armed resistance to the military. The White Paper also reposts that people had obstructed what the White Paper calls the normal movement of army supplies by Pakistani Ship M.V. Swat, when to the Bangalees these 'supplies' represented arms intended to massacre the people. The atmosphere was tense. In some excitement, Yahya said, although he had come to negotiate and that he had the army to exercise restraint, he could not tolerate movement of military supplics' being obstructed by the Awami League. Sheikh Mujib also reacted strongly, saying that while negotiations were going on, it was expected that the army should remain in the barracks. Yahya countered by saying that
