seek concurrence of the West Pakistani political leaders as otherwise the responsibility would be too much for him. He also said that he wanted a signed letter from all the political leaders requesting him to make a Proclamation.
Yahya then said that he proposed to invite the West Pakistani Leaders, and in particular Bhutto. Sheikh Mujib' said that the President was free to do so and that was a matter for him to decide. Sheik Mujib, however, said that he would not directly meet Bhutto but that Yahya could meet him separately. This was in part an expression of resentment at the way in which Bhutto and his party had conducted themselves during and after the discussions held barely six weeks earlier. A more important reason was that Bhutto and Yahya were seen as basically representing the same interests, and, therefore, to allow them to negotiate separately would result in conceding to them a significant negotiating advantage.
I suggested that a working draft should be prepared by the government said, since they could draw upon the resources of the Law Ministry. It was suggested that the Legal Draftsmen of the Ministry of Law be sent for. A copy of the draft was to be sent to the Awami League team as soon as it was ready.
On the morning of 21 March I was sent for by Sheikh Mujib. He and Tajuddin were in the midst of a discussion and he put to me a view that he had been giving thought to the matter of transfer of power and he thought that it would be expedient to Press for immediate transfer of Power only in the provinces and that, given the mood of the Bangalee people, it would not be advisable for Awami League to be seen to take over power at the Centre. It seems there were several reasons which weighed with him in coming to this conclusion.
(1) The mood particularly among the students was that the people's movement should not be compromised and that Awami League should not for the sake of `power' compromise on its demands. Taking power at Center could well be projected as such a compromise. Indeed some of the student leaders, who had met Sheikh Mujib earlier, made this point forcefully.
(2) Taking Power at the Center in the absence of a Constitution would expose Awaim League to the risk of being ineffective at the Centre and thus discrediting themselves even before the Constitution could be framed.
(3) Taking power in the Province only would be a formula whereby the Awami League could consolidate its Position in the East without assuming responsibility for the center, which responsibility it would find difficult to discharge having regard to the preponderance of the Punjabi bureaucracy and army.
(4) This would also enable Awami League an opportunity to muster the resources of the provincial Government, and in particular the police and EPR, to face a situation of armed confrontation, the possibility of which had begun to loom large.
It appeared that Yahya might himself go along with this formula, since he could thereby retain his position at the Center. Accordingly, Sheik Mujib and Tajuddin sought
