পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (প্রথম খণ্ড).pdf/৪৯৫

উইকিসংকলন থেকে
এই পাতাটির মুদ্রণ সংশোধন করা হয়েছে, কিন্তু বৈধকরণ করা হয়নি।
বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ প্রথম খণ্ড
৪৭০

overboard. You cannot rely upon them in law and in order to enforce conventions you cannot rely upon them in law; you have got to go through the process of chaos, disturbances and revolution and I would certainly not like to go through that process. Better far that you should not define the powers of the President in so far as that of the British sovereign, or if you define them, then also define them with those conventions by which those powers are circumscribed. I think, Sir, with regard to the dissolution, viz... the power of the President to dissolve an Assembly when he is of the opinion that the Ministry has lost the confidence of the country, I think Sir, that this thing is so obviously ridiculous that I am sure that the Government will either withdraw it, or place something else a bit more reasonable. To leave it to the President to judge about the possibilities that you have lost the confidence of the country is fantastic in a democratic Constitution. Yes, if he thinks that a present Ministry has lost the confidence of the legislature over which that Ministry presides, then, some powers might be invoked, but to go and dissolve the legislature 011 that ground because they have lost the confidence of the people is a vastly different matter. Then, Sir, a very very important power has been given to the President which will override the entire Constitution, viz., power to declare emergency. All the power to declare and emergency is vested in the President....

 Then, Sir, let us take another provision in this Constitution, viz., that of fundamental rights. Why these fundamental rights have been absolutely put down in the Constitution if provisos were a necessary attachment of them. If these fundamental rights have got to be hedged round with all kinds of provisos, circumscribed by this under these circumstances that under those circumstances, and so on, what is the use of these fundamental rights? You have taken them from the Indian Constitution...

 The Honorable Mr. I. I. Chundrigar: I have taken them from some other document.

 Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy; Some other document, possibly, but, then the Indian Constitution must have borrowed them also from some other document, and therefore, they are of the same pattern and same origin, but I have very great doubts whether the Constitution from which the Honorable Member took these fundamental rights contains all those provisos and hindrances which have been enshrined here. I have compared it even with the Indian Constitution. The then Constitution has certain provisos, had certain restrictions but it is very very important word, viz., “reasonable. There were reasonable restrictions and as soon as that word is put in well, that word “reasonable” has been left out-nobody can do anything which the rights guarantee in so far as they can be invoked in a court of law, but, if in the Constitution you have reasonable restrictions and the work “reasonable” becomes justiciable, at once the courts will then be in a positions to say-if the legislature put down the reasonable restrictions in the fundamental rights-that these are unconstitutional because they are not reasonable. Therefore, Sir, please do no delude us by putting this word that you have been able to put in the fundamental rights. The fundamental rights are of no value at all...

 ...But then, Sir, there are also certain hiatuses in these Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles which I hope will be filled up. I do not find anything either in the Rights of Directive Principles to look after the interest of the agriculturists and labor,