603 বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র : সপ্তম খণ্ড The Indian Air Force was already circling over Dacca, presumably in preparation for attack, and we knew that the Indian Army was gathering strength in the suburbs, also presumably in order to launch an overwhelming artillery and infantry assault. I might add that we were subsequently told by Indian officers when they entered Dacca that the Indian Forces really meant business, if the ultimatum had not been accepted they really would have made an annihilating assault on Dacca. It was desperately urgent to save the city and, about 0830 hours, Colonel Gaffur, Mr. Lempel and myself decided to leave the Neutral Zone and drive to the Cantonment to find out from General Niazi what was happening and whether he had been able to get into contact with the Indian Army. On the way to the Cantonment I informed Mr. Paul-Marc Henry at the UN location by my handset radio what we were doing, and he put the UN radio signalers in Dacca and New Delhi on the alert to stand-by for a possible extremely important message. After some delay we were brought to the Command Bunker, but General Niazi was not to be seen. However, we found General Farman in the Bunker-an obvious prime target looking ashen-faced and completely broken. Staring into space, he gave the impression of having given up everything. He informed me that he was authorized to speak for the whole Pakistan Army in East Pakistan and those they had agreed to accept the Indian ultimatum. He also confirmed that as their Communication Centre had been destroyed they had not been able to inform the Indian Army of their acceptance of the ultimatum. I asked General Farman whether, purely as a channel of communications, he wished me to convey by the UN radio network the acceptance by the Pakistan Army of the Indian ultimatum. General Farman replied in the affirmative, so I led him outside the bunker in order to enable my handset radio to work and contacted Paul Marc Henry at the UN location. I then gave the message in General Farman’s presence to Paul-Marc Henry, and General Farman added two further points: First, to request the Indian Army for a six hour extension to the truce because of the breakdown in the Pakistan Army’s Communications, second, to invite the Indian Army to send a party of staff officers to discuss further arrangements, if possible by helicopter to Dacca Airport, where they would have safe conduct and proper courtesies. I duly passed the whole message by my radio to Paul —Marc Henry who in turn had it transmitted immediately top New Delhi. The time was 0920 hours. Colonel Gaffur, Mr. Lampell and myself then left the bunker area, with the Indian Air Force still circling overhead. However, the message got through to the Indian Command in time, and the threatened onslaught on Dacca did not take place. Dacca: 8 March 1972.
