VYAVAST HA-DARPANA 8】 . The fourth plea is utterly untenable under the Hindu law, as is evident from the whole tenor of the law on rescission of sale, laid down in the Digest of Jaganna?h, especially the two texts of Nanada cited therein (pp. 317 and 318, volume II. Colebrooke's translation,) “When a vendible thing, sold for a just price, is not delivered to the purchaser, this is called non-delivery of a thing sold, a title of judicial procedure.’ And again: “He then, who having sold vendible property for a just price, delivers it not to the buyer, shall be compelled, if it be immovable, to pay for any subsequent damage, as the loss of a crop or the like 3 and, if movable, for the use and profits of it.' Here are express penalties for non-delivery, but not a word about invalidity on that account. The fifth plea is one,which cannot be adduced by appellants, as they are not heirs, and cannot call in question the propriety and honesty of the acts of the widow. The Court therefore, deeming the claim of the responderits valid, and the sale and gift of appellant fictitious, dismiss the appeal with full costs, and affirm the decision of the lower Court. Musst. Uma. Choudhura ni and Gopi Nath Ray, appellants, versus Musst. Indr Maani Choudhuráni- sudder Dewanny Adawlut, 15th July 1847. II. Rání Anna Pârnă sold to the plaintiff half her interest in Pergunnah Kadleah, &c. She put him in possession, but subsequently adopting a son, Harish Chandra, (defendant,) and guardians being appointed, the latter were put in possession of his purchased property by an order of the (civil) court, in consequence of his (plaintiff's) name not having been registered in the collector's office. The plaintiff therefore sues the her adopted son, and his guardians, for possession, and Mr. Courjon, an ijárdalār, for mesne profits. The guardians and the adopted son, in answer, pleaded that the rāni had no power to alienate. The rāmi admitted the sale, but asserted that it was made under conditions which have not been fulfilled, and that the consideration money was not paid. _ Mr. Courjon contended that he was not liable for mesne profits any more than any other ryot ; that a portion of the property sued for had been bought at a sale in execution by Mr. Nicholai, pri, or to the suit, which fact was apparent from the plaint. Nevertheless, he has not been included among the defendants, which is a defect.fatal to the suit- * The principal Sudder Ameen gave a decree in favour of plaintiff against all the defendants, excluding however therefrom the share purchased by Mr. Nicholai. The issue proposed by respondent in bar is, that the adopted son, appellant, cannot be heard in denial of plaintiff’s claim so long as his adoption is not proved. The first issue proposed by the appellant is, that the suit is multifarious in consequence of its being for possession on proof of purchase, and to have an adoption set aside. Baboo Rama Prasad Rāy for the appellant.—The question of the validity of the adoption was for other heirs of the deceased raja to contest, not for the plaintiff. Plaintiff by introducing this question proceeded eontrary to the opinion expressed in the decision above quoted. The case should therefore be monsuited as multifarious. - * * so Mr. waller, in answer—It does not at an follow that the plaintiff shold be nonsuited, because he may have introduced a prayer which the Court may hold to be unnecessary. - The Court on this point are of opinion that the suit is unobjectionable, and that the conditional prayer to declare the adoption invalid was not irregularly introduced. - - ... Judgment.—The fact of the sale to plaintiff is admitted by the rవగీ1 and not denied by her adopted son. Her right" to alienate is; however, contested. • There are numerous precedents of this Court ruling that a Hindu widow can only alienate property in liquidation of her late husband's debts, his srāddha, &c.
