VYAVASTA: DARPANA 101 g o aff inmate of the family-house, mor of any grant to her of a right of residence therein for her life. That alienation is not wasteful and has no resemblance to it. If the right is ill conferred, it will not avail against those in succession. Neiཉྫ་མ་མ་། they any grounds of complaint in this suit of the arrangements as to the turn of worship : w ther they are proper or improper in themselves, they do not furnish ground for a suit which can be maintained only upon the ground of waste or spoliation in the nature osit. It does not appear whether any of the parties defendants have any separate estate of their own: though their mother's property was Stridhan, yet Stridhan devolving by heirship is subject to restraints on alienation by the female heir, and cannot be viewed as the absolute property of the heir. It is alleged that the money will be lost, and fraud and deception are alleged; and where deceptive means <熟Y@ employed there is the more ground for alarm. On the whole then we think that the proper course is to overrule the demurrer; costs to be reserved until the hearing, when the Court will be better able to judge, whether these proposed dealings are wasteful, or a prudent step in the way of a compromise of a claim to litigate which might be ruinous to the estate. S. C. 27th May 1851. Hari Dás Datta eersus Raghu Mani Dási and others. Bell and Taylor's Reports, vol II. part 5. See the case of Tārā Mani and others persus Hem Chānd Majumdār, decided by the Sudder Court on the 18th December 1811, and quoted at pages 83 and 85 of this book.' ' à * - It was formerly held by the Supreme Court that the widow took movable property absolutely, and immovable property for life only ; but it has since been thought, that there is not any ground for such a distinction, and that the widow takes but a life-estate in movable as well as in immovable property. Macn. Cons. H. L. p. 11. In the year 1799, the Court seems to have thought, in the case of Doyśl Chānd Addi cersus Kishori Dasi, that a woman (widow) is not to take more than an estate for life in the movable property of her husband; and I am not able to discover why it first began to declare the widow and mother entitled to an absolute property in the movable, and a life interest only in the immovable estate. Ibid. p. 20. in the above year the Court did not make any distinction between movable and immovable property in the hands of a Hindu woman. After that period, a distinction again originated: and widows claiming as heirs of their husbands, and mothers taking upon partition, were held to be entitled to movable estate absolutely, and to immovable for life only. Widows and mothers so taking respectively, have always been considered to stand upon the same footing in point of interest—and in the case of Kāshi Nath Basāk and Ramá Nāth Basāk against Hara Sundari Däsi, it was the opinion of the Court, upon a bill of review, that a widow taking by the death of her husband was not entitled to more than an estate for life in either movable or immovable property. This was in the year '1818. How, the Court came to distinguish between movable and immovable property, with reference to the rights of widows or of mothers, I am mot, as I have before intinuated, at all informed. The Hindu law is not sufficiently explicit upon the subject, to justify such a distinction ; and it must be admitted, that giving these parties a life interest only, in each species of estate, will be more just as it relates to others, and more beneficial as it relates to themselos. Macn. Cons. H. L. p. 36. I cannot, but wish that the law, as it was certainly understood to exist, in the case of Käss Náth Basāk and Ramá Nāth Byssk against Hara Sundari Dási may be adhered to. The Judges were satisfied that a distinction between movable and inmovable property in the hands of a widow was groundless.—Macn. Cons. H. L. p. 2s. Ibid. p. 82. Vide Privy Councii decisiom in the case of Káshi Nith Basāk & another versus Hara Sundari Dási & another. Cases bearing on the vyavastle' No. 35.
