পাতা:ব্যবস্থা-দর্পণঃ প্রথম খণ্ড.djvu/২৪৭

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VYAVASTHA’-DARPANA ,】2L over the immovables beyond a moderate and frugal enjoyment of. them. After her death, the estate, which she enjoyed frugally during her life time, shall pass to the heirs of her husband.” Mr. Colebrooke, in his letter of the 27th of February 1812, addressed to Mr. Harington upon the subject of Bhaiya *Jhā’s case, then in judgment, says that this doctrine, which he considered to be that of the Mithila. school, is no doubt at variance with the doctrine of the Bengal school, which controls the widow even in the disposal of personal property.” And Mr. Harington, in his MS. judgment in the case before referred to, only states “that the Ratnaskara and Chinta mani are unquestionably works of the highest authority in Tirhoot ;” thereby seeming to admit of a different doctrine in Bengal, as affirmed by Mr. Colebrooke. It further appears to be the general understanding of the persons acting in, or connected with, that Court, that the widow takes, in Bengal, the same estate, with the same power of disposition over it, in the personalty as in the realty, devolving to her by the death of her husband without sons ; and that this has always been considered to be the rule in that Court. The same opinion was communicated by the two Pandits of that Court, who agreed in all points with our Pandits, except as to the invalidity of a gift of movable or immovable property by the widow, as against herself. The general doctrine of all these Pandits (with the exception I haye mentioned) is to be found in the answer given by the Court Pandits upon the argument of this case”. hey rest their doctrine upon the authority of the „Daz yabhaga and Da gatatna, as overruling, in Bengal, the authority of the Ratna kara and the Chinta mani, not denying the authority of these last mentioned books when uncontradicted or uncensured by the former ; but affirming that the Ratna karé and Chintasmani are contradicted and overruled by the Da yabhaga and Dá vatatna upon the point in judgment ; which latter books, they affirm, give only a life interest to the widow in both the real and personal estate, with the power of disposition as to both for the benefit of her husband's soul, observing moderation, but without authority to dispose of either for worldly purposes, unconnected with religious purposes, without the consent of her deceased husband's kinsmen. 给 - سمعي. The five Pandits, who were opposed to the others, affirm the authority of the Ratna kara and Chinta mani in giving to the widow an independent authority over the movable part of her husband's estate, though not over the fixed property other than for her life ; and they deny that this doctrine is contradicted, or declared inadmissible, by the Dasyabha ga or Daryatatwa, in neither of which latter, they say, is the subject particularly noticed ; and they contend that, by these last mentioned authorities, the donation of the property by the widow is valid, though they admit that the donor incurs moral guilt by it. This narrows the inquiry to this point, viz. whether the Da’yabhaga (which is admitted by all to be the ruling authority for Bengal) does invalidate the disposal of personal property by the widow at her pleasure (in which case it could not properly be decreed to her absolutely), or whether she has the absolute right of disposition over it by law, however she may incur religious or moral guilt by such disposition for worldly purposes of her own. She may, in general, dispose of stri’ahana as she pleases, except immovable property given her by her husband, in which she has only a life interest, and upon her death it descends to his heirs, and not to her own paternal heirs ; and except immovable property, given to her by her own parents in her maiden state, which always goes to her brother if she die without issue. (Dá. bhá. Ch. IV. Sec. III- para. 12). - In Jagannātha's Digest (3 Coleb. Dig. 457–466,) an opinion is advanced, that “though a widow is prohibited from conveying away immovable property by her own voluntary act, and for purposes of her own, yet the donation may be valid.” . It must have been against this doctrine that Mr. Colebrooke, in the letters referred to touching this subject, states, that “it appears, on inquiry and research, not to have been sanctioned by any previous author of note, nor, as is believed, by any writer whomsoeverIt is, on the contrary, in opposition to the whole current of authorities, both in and out of Bengal.”

न्छ; -

  • The doctrine aforesaid has been published in Sir Erancia Managhten's Considerations on the Hindu Law, and quoted in the following judgment of the Privy Council. IE -

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