VYAVASTHA-DARPANA 377 recorded his opinion that so thuch of the decree of the Provincial Court, as revorsed that part of the zillah court's decree which left the plaintiff in possession of the property then alleged to be held by him in his own right (although disputed by the defendants, and not investigated by the judge), should be affirmed, but that the part of it which virtually maintains the validity of the deed of partition should be reversed, and that such part of the decree of the Zillah court as rjects the said deed as inadmissible ...hould be affirmed; but the final deeision in this case was left for the sitting of another judge. Subsequently the cause was brought before the senior judge; and two other questions were put to the Pandits, partly with the view to define, as accurately as possible, the grounds of decision in the present case, and partly to ascertain the provisions of the Hindu law in other analogous cases. . - 1st. Supposing the deed of partition, executed by Rām Kánta, to be a legal and valid instrument, would it be rendered nugatory and of no avail from the circumstance of the distribution specified in it not having been carried into offect during the life-time of Rám Ká nta, although the opposition shown by the plaintiff prevented its being carried into effect P - - 2nd. If Râm Kánta in his life-time had put all the parties, excepting the plaintiff, into possession of the shares alloted to them in the deed respectively, and had divested himself of all proprietory right, would such distribution of the property, movable and immovable, whether acquired or ancestral, be valid (notwithstanding the declared illegality of an unequal distribution of ancestral inmovable property,’ ? The Pandits differed from each other on these points. The answer delivered by Chaturbhuj APandif was to the following effect:— * --> 1st. Supposing the deed of partition to be a legal and valid instrument, still a title deed, in virtue of which possession has not been taken, cannot be received in law as evidence of right, and there is no provision in the law to make such deed available, even though possession had not been obtained solely by reason of the opposition shown by an adverse party. The law declares further that this possession must have been in sight of the adverse party, without let or molestation on his part, and that possession for three successive generations' even is mot sufficient, unless it has been maintained in sight of the adverse party and with his acquiescence. Now, if by reason of the opposition created by the plaintiff, who in this case has stood forward as the adverse party, the defendants did not, during the life-tinue of Râni Kánta o;.tain possession of the property specified in the deed above alluded to, it cannot be deemed valid or binding on the parties, for the reason before assigfied; viz. that a title deed unaccompanied by possession must be disallowed as evidence of right. o Some of the authorities cited in support of the above opinion are as follow :— 4th. Pittimaha-sanhitti :—“Occupancy alone is not sufficient to constitute right without a title, nor will the production of a title suffice unsupported by occupancy. It is therefore determined that the existence of both is essential to constitute a right.” to 5th. Vrihaspati-sanhites:–“The right to land docs not accrue from mere occupancy, nor by the production of a title alone. From the union of both results a right, not otherwise.” 7th. NA RADA: —“For the first, gift is evidence (of right); for the second, occupancy with a title; for the third, occupancy of long and uninterrupted continuance.” - * * 9th. JA'GNYAVALRYA :—“Where there has not been possession even for a short time, a title is of little avail. Dut where occupancy exists in one part, it may be said to exist with regard to the whole.” 11th. VRIIIAseAtr:—“Immovable property acquired by partition, by purchase, by descent, or from the king, is confirmed by occupancy, and lost by neglect.” - aThe answer delivered by Chaturbhuj to the second question was to the following effect:Supposing the deed of partition executed by Rām Kánta to have been acceded to during his life-time by all the parceners (excepting the plaintiff) whose names were therein specified; that they obtained actual possession of their respective allotmenta, with the execption, however, of the particular share of immovable property in the possession of the plaintiff; and that Râm Kánta divested himself of all proprietary right in the estate, yet the said deed specifies two descriptions of property, viz. aneestrul, im
