সাহিত্য ও রসতত্ত্ব 8vტ সত্য বটে, বিভাব রস অথবা স্থায়িভাবের উৎপত্তির প্রতি কারণ (efficient cause), or ‘of’so সেই উৎপন্ন স্থায়িভাবের গমক । अश्छाबनमूश्टक ब्रनाश्डूडि श्हेप्ड अडिब्र बलिग्न भन्न काब्रन। ब्रन वा emotion८कदणभोज खाद्रमान অমৃভাবসমূহের সমষ্টি মাত্র,—কোনও পৃথক পদার্থ নহে। শারীরবিকৃতি হইতে আমাদের রসবোধের cकांन७ शृथक नखा नारे । छांभांब्र 'cउiष' वा 'cद्रौजब्रन' बांद्र किङ्कङ नtरु,-ऎश ८कदन चांबांद्र DDDD DBBS DDDDS DBBBDS BBBBBB BBBB BBBBDD D BBBDD DDD D aggregate মাত্র। এই দিক দিয়া বিচার করিলে অমুকার্যগত মুখ্য রসামুভূতির প্রতি অমুভাৰসমুহও বিভাবের মতই উৎপাদক কারণ,—যদিও দর্শকের দৃষ্টিতে উহার অমুকাৰ্যগত রসের বা স্থায়িভাবের "অমুমাপক হইতে পারে বটে । Joos “James says, "Bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion."...Certainly, in my opinion, no case can be made out against its main contention, namely, that the experiences, feelings or states of mind which we call ‘emotions' are caused by, and are absolutely dependent upon, bodily changes. If there were no bodily changes, if consequently the field of consciousness were to contain no sensations of endosomatic origin, there could be no emotion. “Nor do I see any great weight in the criticisms which have been brought against the use of the word is in the passage cited above. It has been pointed out that to say “our feeling of the [bodily] changes as they occur (i. e. the sum total of the endosomatic sensations) is the emotion”, is to assert an identity between the emotion and the sensation, and that although there may be a causal connescion between the sensation and the state of mind we call emotion, this is not logically equivalent to identity. But, as against this. I would contend that the connexion between the endosomatic sensations, and the affectivo component of the total mental state (i. e. the ‘emotion') is precisely the same as that between any other sensation and the change in consciousness produced thereby. So far as mind is concerned, sensations emanatirog from my own body are ju8t externa), just as much 'given ab extra' as those emanating from what I describe as “objects' outside my body, and should be treated in the same way as the latter. If we say that the change in consciousness produced by an ordinary visual sensation is ‘perception,' I do not see that we have any right to deny that the change in consciousness
