বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড
offset continuing deficits. The Fourth Five-Year Plan envisaged a substantial increase in domestic production by 1975, but, even if this could have been achieved, imports would still have been necessary because of rapid population growth.
Unfortunately, far from increasing, production has fallen catastrophically. According to figures quoted by Dr. Rohde, based on recent estimates made by the United States Administration for International Development, domestic production in the coming year is likely to be 2.28 million tons below what was estimated before the present troubles. In short, East Pakistan faces its largest food deficit since the Bengal famine of 1943. Some idea of what is involved may be grasped by recalling that three million people are believed to have perished in that famine.
It is not difficult to enumerate the causes of this alarming situation. Hundreds of thousands of farmers have fled to India and are still fleeing. The agricultural credit system has totally collapsed. Public works programmes and private business activities have virtually ceased, and throughout the province there is an acute shortage of cash. Hoarding is taking place and the price of rice has risen sharply.
Dr. Rohde quoted United States AID estimates that some 2.9 million tons of grain imports; will be needed to supplement domestic production merely to ensure an average daily consumption of 15 ounces (1,600 calories) a head. That is an absolute minimum, since even a sedentary adult requires 1,600 to 1,900 calories to maintain reasonable health. But, since the maximum import of food grains in any normal year up till now was 1 .5 million tons in 1970, the prospect of importing and distributing nearly twice this amount in present circumstances is poor.
ven if the requisite quantities of food could be shipped and off-loaded, the ability to move them to deficit areas is severely limited. Chittagong and other ports are operating well below capacity, because so many port workers have fled. Military operations by the army and sabotage by the insurgents have severely disrupted road and rail communications.
About 90 per cent of the population live in the rural areas, and the proportion is now probably higher because half of the urban population has fled. But it is here, where the need is greatest, that the Pakistan Army's hold is most tenuous. Thus, there is real fear that if food distribution is left solely to the military they will give first priority to the restoration of order and will not hesitate to use food as a political weapon. If this happens, the insurgents can be expected to disrupt the process.
Dr. Rohde told the Toronto Conference that against this background, there were three urgent requirements. First, that international opinion should demand that the opposing parties in East Pakistan permit sufficient food to reach the affected areas regardless of whether these are under the control of the army or the insurgents. Second, the only way of ensuring that the food reaches the people in direct need was to persuade the Pakistan Government to accept that distribution should be under the supervision and administration of a greatly augmented U.N. staff. Third, that an international team of experts should be permitted to enter East Pakistan without delay. Its tasks would be to determine here are the
