পাতা:বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড).pdf/৪৮৯

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461 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড শিরোনাম সূত্র তারিখ ‘পুর্ব পাকিস্তান বায়াফ্রা নয়। গুস্তাভ এফ, পাপানেক, ৮ এপ্রিল, ১৯৭১ জান, ডব্লিউ টমাস EAST PAKISTAN IS NOT BIAFRA The current struggle for independence in East Pakistan (or Bangladesh as its people now call it) is often evaluated in terms of the abortive secessionist movement of Biafra, in which the Federal Government of Nigeria ultimately prevailed. To base policy and predictions about events in East Pakistan on the Biafra model would be the diplomatic equivalent of the classic military error of preparing for the next war by being ready to fight the last one over again. There are six major differences between the two situations which suggest that sooner or later the independence movement will succeed in East Pakistan. First, in Pakistan it is a majority of the nation's populace, which seeks independence. The 75 million East Pakistanis, who gave about 85 per cent of their votes to pro- autonomy parties, constitute about 55 per cent of the population in Pakistan; in Nigeria the Ibos, the only major supporters of Biafra did not constitute even 20 per cent of the population. Second, the 60,000 troops from West Pakistan fighting in East Pakistan are separated from their logistical base in the West wing by 3,000 miles of an air/sea supply route. In normal times the two wings arc separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. With the Indian government's ban on Pakistani over flights, West Pakistan has to detour around the southern trip of India to fly supplies into East Pakistan. In Nigeria the Federal government could move troops and supplies overland with no major natural obstacle separating the front from the supply base. Third, there is in fact no "front" in the accepted sense of the term. The front is everywhere, and cities with military bases are islands in a sea of hostile peasants. At the time this is being written, the military controls only the major cities, which in predominantly agricultural East Pakistan include less than 10 per cent of the population. Attempts to control the countryside by relying on bombing and strafing have been ineffective up to now, and, cannot hope to succeed any more than American air power has been successful in controlling the countryside of Vietnam. Fourth, in the absence of an external threat, the Nigerian federal government could devote all its military resources to the suppression of the Biafran secession. In contrast, the military in Pakistan deems it necessary to keep the majority of the army in West Pakistan to guard the frontiers against a hostile India. Fifth, the Biafran military resistance was ultimately crippled by the absence of a significant supply of externally provided arms, East Pakistan's 1,000 mile long border with India runs through marshes, hills and jungles, which for all practical purposes render