525 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড Apart from the moral issue, as we consider the vast changes in armament and all the other developments in such military alliances as SEATO since they were formed, is it not wise, at a time like this, to face afresh the question: Is the Administration simply repeating an old stance? Is Pakistan really so important to the USA as to justify paying any such price as you would pay for its professions of allegiance, at the risk of alienating Bangladesh's 75,000,000 and India's 550,000,000, and American and world moral standards? What does "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind" dictate in such a case? And what does the faithfulness to one's vows and standards as a Christian require in such a situation if one is to have more than a political membership? One more major question, Mr. President. Both you and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi give us the impression that fear of what China may do in the Bangladesh situation weighs heavily with you, not so? You assume that if, for example, in the absence of any other valid solution, India were to be driven to go to the rescue of Bangladesh, having declared is as her strictly limited purpose to make it possible for the Bangladesh people to create their own government and enable the millions of miserable escapees to return home as free me China might intervene. Evidently you and Mr. Kissinger, despite his scholarly expertise in other directions, share the general dangerous misconception of the nature of the Peking regime. It is widely assumed that Mao's regime has followed the Russian, even the Stalinist pattern of readiness for ruthless repression, even invasion. But there is abundant documentation for the following understanding of Mao's way: Since the beginning of his movement in the 1920's, culminating in the Cultural Revolution, and emerging into the world's consciousness in the present new diplomacy, Mao has thoroughly taught all his people that, on the one hand, they may need to deal with regimes with which they differ, however strongly this being a matter of temporary tactics-while, on the other hand, "whoever opposes imperialism or makes revolution has out support," as Peking declared in its editorial on Army Day, August 1. Red China has a massive record of standing for the liberation of struggling peoples, but by measures short of invasions, despite her entering North Korea when she felt her own borders threatened and her later taking possession of certain disputed areas on her borders with India. Concerning her attitude to the Pakistan-IndiaBangladesh tangle, while China, by virtually warning India, "Hands off East Bengal," to this extent supports Yahya Khan against India, she could not go much further in abetting a tyrannical Right reactionary regime without committing ideological, moral, political suicide. We need therefore not fear a Chinese invasion of the South Asian subcontinent. But Mao's tactical stance in the present situation means that he wants to war off India from going to the rescue of Bangladesh so that not only East Bengal but West Bengal will become desperate and deteriorate into another Vietnam, for which the stage is all set, as the writer has developed the picture in "China's Strategy, a New Vietnam." When that Bangladesh desperation comes-and both Washington's pro-Pakistan stance and Delhi's dangerously delaying Bangladesh policy directly contribute to itthe well prepared and powerful pro-China Communists of West Bengal, expert in
