627 ংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ ত্রয়োদশ খন্ড (iv) The overall assessment of the situation at which the mission arrived is not encouraging. Above all, the mission found it difficult to discern in the present situation the basis for rapid economic recovery in the Province. As it saw the situation at the time of its visit, the obstacles in the way to normalization appeared overwhelming-essential elements in the Province's infrastructure were severely damaged, including in particular the transport and communications system, and retained vulnerable to further destruction; there was little understanding among the authorities concerned of the complexity of the problem of economic revival and consequently neither a program to aid recovery nor effective management; and there was all-pervasive fear as a major inhibiting factor. Reinforcing each other, these factors together appeared to the mission to amount to a formidable problem that would defy early resolution. (v) While this is the judgment the mission reached after extensive travel in the Province and after thorough deliberation, it also needs to be said that the factors that entered into its judgment formed a highly unstable combination. Just as at the time of the mission's visit all the major elements in the situation appeared to reinforce each other in making early normalization impossible to envisage, it is conceivable that a major improvement in one of them may have a "snowball" effect. Thus, it is possible that the railway will function better than the mission thought likely and that, if in addition the carrying capacity of the coastal fleet is increased considerably and the country boats reappear, the physical constraints to recovery could be reduced considerably, and thus incentives for renewed economic activity be strengthened to the point where the psychological constraints lose some of their power. Similarly, everybody familiar with war-torn economies is aware that the problems of physical destruction are less of an obstable than they may at first glance appear to be if there is confidence and the determination to make things work among the populace and if there is purposeful direction. Thus, if somehow the element of fear, distrust and uncertainty were removed from the scence and if conditions were created that allowed the administration to function effectively, then it may turn out that the physical constraints are less formidable than they now appear to be. Yet, at the time of the mission's visit, there was no concrete evidence that improvements of the kind mentioned were about to happen; hence the mission found itself unable to come to a more encouraging view of the outlook for rapid economic recovery. I. THE CURRENT SITUATION A. Major Economic Impacts of the Conflict 1. The Mission noted four principal impacts of the conflict whose inhibiting effects upon the functioning of the economy are evident at present. The first is the general destruction of property in cities, towns and villages. This was inflicted in small part-and selectively-by the insurgents during the period in which—they remained in control of certain areas, but was largely the result of military activity in the major cities and towns and along the major road arteries between them. The second is the major damage to the transport and communications networks, inflicted by the insurgents during the early days
