Gen, Kaul says, If our Army had gone into East Pakistan in aid of the liberation force soon after March 25, we would have had overwhelming advantages. We would have found under two divisions of Pakistani troops engaged in putting down the civil war. It would have been the correct campaigning season.
“We would have caught the Pakistanis disembarking from ships along the coast line, without unloading facilities. The Civil population, hostile to Pakistan would have been emotionally with us and would have welcomed us for coming to its aid.
“But this action would have been possible only if there had advance plans of action. Actually, we did little except indulge in academic discussions and make empty gestures of sympathy.
Gen kaul goes to say, “As Pakistan has now inducted in East Bengal troops whose total strength stood at more than four divisions on May, 1. 1971, we are at a disadvantage with them operationally. If we had hit Pakistan and in march or April, 1971 we would have fought a war in the most favorable conditions.
“Now the initiative has passed to the enemy, who will choose the time and place which suits him most to hit us. Those who fear that recognition of Bangladesh might lead to war should ask whether not recognizing it will prevent one”.
After referring to the current political development in Pakistan, particularly Mr. Bhutto’s bid to gain power with the aid of younger army officers. Gen. Kaul “If Yahya wins in this struggle for power, there is likely to be a result in both wings of Pakistan.
In the present circumstances, Gen Kaul says, “The only course available to Yahya khan may be to wages war India, but, whether Pakistan has a war with India or not, one things seems certain: Once leadership in East Bengal passes into the arising hands, as is already happening. East and West Bengal inspired by China, may become an enlarged Bangladesh.
“China would told great influences in these two regions under one banner and would thus gain ultimately at the expense of both Indian and Pakistan”
Without outlining any definite plan or military action, the battle-scarred of the NEFA campaign proffers the following advice.
“Our Government should not take a month of Sunday to make an assessment speedy action as time is of great consequence, we should soon come to a concrete agreement with the USSR to meet this new threat.”
