সংযোজন-৩
| শিরোনাম | সূত্র | তারিখ |
| মার্চ ’৭১-এর অনুষ্ঠিত ইয়াহিয়া মুজিব বৈঠক সম্পর্কে একটি প্রতিবেদন |
সাউথ এশিয়ান রিভিউ | জুলাই ১৯৭১ |
NEGOTIATING FOR BANGLADESH: A PARTICIPANTANT'S VIEW
Rehnian Sobhan
A central question in any analysis of the events leading to the present crisis in Pakistan is: did the political will needed for a settlement between East and West Pakistan ever really exist? One of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's economic advisers, recounting the sequence of the negotiations, argues here that one of the principal difficulties encountered by the Awami League was that neither the President and his representatives nor Mr. Bhutto's PPP could be persuaded to specify their negotiating positions. Yet by March 23 it appeared to Sheikh Mujib's advisers that the major legal, political and economic issues had been resolved; they were waiting to be called for a fined session, and then the President and his negotiators left Dacca. The generals and Mr. Bhutto appeared to have been buying time to build a West Pakistan coalition. From February 15 to March 25, discussion of the Awami League proposals was “an elaborate charade”.
Conflicting Explanations
The course of events within Pakistan, and Bangla Desh in particular, is in great measure going to be determined by the intentions and decisions of those military leaders who rule Pakistan today. In assessing their possible course of action it is instructive to look back on the events within Pakistan which culminated in the occurrences of March 25 and their elemental aftermath.
It was widely believed outside Pakistan that the decision by President Yahya to crack down on Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League Party was due to a breakdown in their political negotiations in Dacca prior to March 25. This has been given some currency by President Yahya's broadcast of March 26. But a subsequent press release of the Government of Pakistan dated May 6 staled that the military action was designed as a pre-emptive strike against a secession move by Mujib planned for March 26 and aided by a mutiny of Bengali troops and by Indian support. This subsequent explanation was at no stage touched upon by the President in his March 26 broadcast, and seems to have been a belated afterthought; no disinterested observer has come forward to lend credibility to this story.
What really happened? It is easy to piece together facts based on personal knowledge, but motives are harder to interpret. The emphasis will therefore be on putting the record straight, though some element of speculation remains unavoidable.
South Asian Review, volume 4. Number 4, July 1971
