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YYAVASTHA-DARPANA. 87:。 but in violation of the rules and disregard of material ceremonies. In respect to the 1st, if a widow adopt a person under an alleged authority from her husband and it prove to be unfounded, the acceptance of him as a son is as initio invalid. If there be any other informality, which may vitiate wither the gift of a son or the acceptance thereof, the elleet will be the same, and the subsequent ceremonies duly performed will not cure the defect. The person in such ease would continue the heir of his natural parents, and will not be entitled to the expense of his marriage nor be a slave in the family, as it is mentioned, “ When he who has procreated a son gives him to another, and that child is born again by the rites of initiation, his relation to the giver ceases, and a relation to the adopter commences.” IIence, if a widow adopts a person without due authority from the husband, that child is not born again by the rites of initiation, and neither his relation to the giver ceases nor does a relation to the adopter eominence, because the acceptance was not complete, in the absence of due authority. In the 2nd case the circumstances are dislerent; the person adopted is given by his natural parent, and received under due authority by the widow; the giving and receiving are complete, and thereby the right of one ceases and the right of another commences. Only the filial relation between the adopter and the adopted was not established, for want of due observance of the rules or performance of the necessary ceremonies of adoption. Under such circumstances, the filial relation to the natural parent having ceased by the giving and the accepting, while none having been established between the adopter and the adopted, the child cannot be regarded as a member of either family. The shastras therefore provide that he is cntitled to his imarriage expenses and is to be maintained as a slave in the family of the intending adopter. Thus is explained the effect produced by the difference between the two conditions above mentioned. W. The effect of adoption in due form. The person legally adopted, with due observance of the rules and ceremonies, ceases to have any claim to the family or estate, or to perform the funeral rites, of his natural father. He not only inherits the estate of his adoptive father, but likewise lineally and collaterally to the estates of the near and distant kinsmen of that person. He likewise represents the real legitimate Ron in relation to his adoptive mother, and her ancestors become his maternal grandsires. With reference to the remarks under the tth head, the question arises whether a widow, having an alleged authority to adopt from her late husband, can bring a suit against him who would be regarded as his representative in the event of there being no adoption, for the establishment of her right to adopt under such authority. In a case in the Privy Council (Moor's Indian Appeals, vol. III, p. 359,) their lordships carefully avoided giving an opinion on a nearly similar point. But Mr. Macpherson, in his Civil Procedure, 3rd Edition, page 42, states that it was a question long undecided whether the civil courts had jurisdiction to entertain a suit which is brought, not for the enforcement of any civil right, but for the bare declaration of a right to perform certain religious ceremonies or indeed to decide on any right merely in the abstract. They have however latterly exercised such a jurisdiction.—In support of this view, see Calcutta Sudder Dewanny Adawlut Decisions of 1853, page 58, and Agra Sudder Dewanny Adawlut Decisions of 1853, pages 46