VYA VASTFIA-DARPANA. 880 The author of the Mitákshará observes that, if a boy have no parents, he, though independent, should not be personally liable for the debts of his father, for Kátyáyina has said that, though a boy have no parents and in consequence be free from dependence, yet he is not to be responsible for his paternal debts, because, independence is vested in the eldest, that is, in him who has attained age and qualification as before described. Before majority, no boy is liable to be summoned to any Court or to be imprisoned, just as he is not liable for debts. For it is said, they who have not attained discretion, ambassadors, persons about to give gifts for the sake of religion, persons engaged in religious ceremonies, and persons who are advanced in years, are not to be summoned to any Court or imprisoned. There is an apparent inconsistency of opinion between the sage before quoted and another sage who declared that a son from his birth is bound to pay his paternal debts, even from his own resources, to preserve his father from Ferdition, while that sage says that he becomes responsible only after attaining years of discretion. The meaning of the sage alluded to is that the son is bound to pay such debts after arriving at majority and not before. But the restriction as to the payment of debts till attaining majority LL L0S aaSLLLLLL LL LL GLLLLLLLLCCS LLS LLS LLS CCLLL LSS LLSL LLLLS LLLS 0000 GGG GGCCCCLL LL μαζ/ίνη. From the above it will appear that, before attaining majority, every at whether worldly or religious is prohibited, cross (/, proformance of obson's, or of the like nature, which is “pecially emjoinetl hy the SÅás/ras and mot option:ı]. N ww thi' :ltıthority t1Í :í mıir10r te leis wifi { »r 1 he adoption of a sou will wome under the class of restrictions. 1st. He has not arrived at the age of diseretion determined by the Shiwords, and therefore cannot possess the qualification, requir j for such an act.—ondly. Adoption is not enjoined by the Shis/was as “...Yo'na, ’’ or enjoined, but “Asimoya, ’’ or optional, as it is said that he, who desires the funeral cake, libations, and solemn rites, and the celebrity of his name, is required to adopt a son. But by the omission of adoption he incurs no sin, he only deprives himself of certain advantages: and therefore adoption is not a “Nitya " but a “Kāmga " art; as such, like all other acts of a like nature, it rests in the desire of the party and is not enjoined by the S/4x/rax. Adoption by a minor is invalid, since he cannot possess discretion as already defined. Any authority of the kind given by a minor, like any testainentary writing or verbal bequest made by him, is invalid, according to the Hindu law.-- This doctrine is likewise consistent with reason, because adoption in general deprives the legal heir of his rights, and a person who is capable of doing that should he qualified to perform the acts specified in the definition of discretion. That discretion being unattainable, according to the Sháxtras, by persons under the age of sixteen, the restriction must be applied to all avis of a minor which he is not specially allowed to perform. Besides, as the judgment of a minor must be immature, any such power on his part is obviously liable to the greatest abuses, through the influence of interested and designing parties. It has therefore been the policy of the Hindu Legislators most strictly to forbid the recognition of any power in a minor where discretion is necessary to the validity of an act. This policy is consonant with the opinion of foreign jurists. The civil Roman law attached such weight to so important an alteration in families, as adoption, and so zealously watched such acts, that it provided that no adoption should take place without the authority of the magistrate. The intention of such restriction evidently was to control such alteration in the line of inheritance in a family to the prejudice of others. This principle in a great measure coincides with that of the ILindu Legislative sages, who ordain that 48
