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vyAVASTHA-DARPANA. $91.4 Second, ‘Upon the doctrine that “he who has only one son is to be considered as chiluteus. Now, the first text is evidently out of the case, if Mr. Macnaghten's explanation be correct ; and as to the second, in referring to the passages on which the Pundits rest, they manifestly relate, not to a person who receives a child, but to one who gives a child, in adoption. Upon the whole, therefore, for these reasons, we have come to the conclusion, that the adoption of Ramanadha was not valid, and that the judgment of the Sudder Court upon that point must be reversed. 1f we had come to a different conclusion on this subject, it would have been necessary for t us to examine into the effect of the deed, alleged to have been executed by Pencatadry, on the adoption of Jaganadha. Feeling the hardship of this case on Ramanadha, we have looked with some anxiety to see whether his title could be maintained, on the ground that it was subsequently recognized by Jaganndha, and that such subsequent recognition might be considered equivalent to previous assent. We think it, however, impossible to maintain his right upon this ground. Supposing Joannadha to have acquiesced, after he came of age, in the division of property made by pencatadry, it was an acquiescence on the footing of a right already askerted by the father, to axist in Ramanadia, and it does not appear that Juqunadha possessell all the knowledge, or was placed in the circumstances which must exist, in order to make his ratification binding, even if we assume, what is not by any means clear, that such subsequent ratification, would be eqivalent for that purpose, in Hindoo law, to previous consent. It appears, however, that there was some property, both real and personal, of which Pencatadry had the power of disposing; and by an act inter rivos, without the consent of Jaganadha : and we think that he made a gift, as far as he could, of his property between his two sons.—We think, that offect must be given against the estate of Jaganadha, to the intentions of Pencatadry, as far as he had the power of effecting them. If Jayanadha takes, as we think he is entitled to do, the whole ancestral property, which the father could not dispose of, without his consent, we think he must give up, for the benefit of Ramanadha, the whole property included in the division, to the disposition of which his consens was not necessary. Ramamadha being removed from the contest, as to the succesion of Jaganatha, the question as to that succession is in dispute between Lutchmiputty and Atchama : for Runyama, though she may have the same interest with Atchama in opposing Lutchmiputty, supports his claim. The question then is, was this boy well adopted or not Upon the whole, after a long and anxious consideration of the subject, we feel ourselves called upon to differ upon this point also, with respect to the adoption, from the judgment of the Court below, and to hold that Lutchmiputty was well adopted, and is entitled to succeed to the whole estate of Jaganadia, subject to such maintenance as his widows may by law be entitled to-16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, & 30th of June, and 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of July 1846.-Moore's Indian Appeals, Wol. IV. pp. 89—118. , ,