WYAVASTHA-DARPANA. 1062 enbequently to her sonditional als of her husband-estate, and opposing nach eonditional als to have been the only means of preventing the foreclosure of the original mortgage, would either or both of these circumstances have the effect of legalizing the transaction ?" In reply, the posits concurred in stating that the date of the adoption could not affect the merits of the case, but they differed as to the other point; Sobharam Shastree giving it as his opinion, that the widow would be authorised in making the transfer in case of distreas, which rendered it inevitable, and that this was such a case; Ramtunnoo, on the other hand, admitting the legality of the transfer in a case of inevitable distress, but contending that this was not a case of that nature, as the minor would not be answerable for his father's debts until he came of age. The third Judge, on weighing these conflicting opinions, considered the former to be . entitled to the greater weight, chiefly because it coincided with the Wyatasthés delivered on former and similar occasions, and partly because it was evident that the distress in the present case was of that nature which was contemplated by law. He was of opinion, that no sufficient proof had been advanced that any deduction had been made from the loan. On the contrary, he conceived the transaction to have been fair and open; that the conditional sale should be held to have become absolute on the expirໄion of the period specified in the written obligation of the appellant, and he was of opinion, that the decree of the Court below to that effect should be affirmed as being in every respect just and proper. By reason of this difference between the opinions of the second and third Judges, the case was postponed to another sitting for a final decision. On the 24th of June 1828, the chief and fourh Judges (W. Leycester and W. Dorin) expressed their concurrence in the view of the case taken by the third Judge. They field that no sufficient evidence had been adduced to invalidate the conditional sale, which had become absolute on the expiration of the specified period, and that the only point which remained to be determined was whether or not the transaction should be recognised as valid according to the tenets of the Hindoo law. On this question they inclined to the doctrine laid down by Sobharam Shastree, that the conditional sale, by the widow of Bishennath, of her husband's landed estate, was valid, notwithstanding the fact of his having given her permission to adopt, and of her having subsequently adopted a son in pursuance of such permission, inasmuch as both the law officers agreed in declaring that the transaction would be legal supposing a sufficient case of necessity to have been made out, and as it must be admitted that, when the period fixed for the foreclosure of the original mortgage drew nigh, there did exist a sufficient case of distress to justify recourse to the measure. The oonditional sale was exccuted to prevent the foreclosure of the mortgage, whereby the interest of the son about to be adopted by the widow would doutless be best consulted; and although the measure had not the effect of saving the estate ultimately from alienation, yet it put off the evil day, and steps might have been taken in the interval to avert the loss altogether. For these and other reasons, it was finally decreed that the judgment of the Court below be affirmed. Date the 24th of June 1828.—§. D. A. Rep. vol. III. pp. 228 to 281. - Case No. 541 of 1847. Bamon Does Mookerjee and others, 4ppellants, versus Zarisee alias Shoyama'nee Dekea, Respondent, g y Case No. 166 of 1848. Terines alias sioyamsnee Debes, Appellast, versus Bames Doss Mookerjee and others, Respondent». II. These are two regular appeals brought against the decision of the Principal sudder Ameen
