* vyAvAsrHA DARPANA ıssi, of Nadoles, dated the 30th of September 1847, in a suit brought by the plaintiff, Must, Twinee alias shoyamunee Debea, on her right of inheritance as widow of her deceased husband, Chunder Bhoosun. És A. • These cases being called on for hearing, the appellants in case No 64] objected that the plaint eould not be admitted, as it contained in fast two conflicting claims.-one on the part of Tarines, widow of Chunder Bhoosun, advancing own right to succeed to his estate as his widow, and another in behalf of her son, to be adopted, under permission from her husband. ' Plaintiff sets forth that she is (under the deed of division made by Mohadeb, the common ancestor of the braneh of the family with which he is connected,) heir to her husband, and the , rightful owner of the deceased's estate; and that she is proprietor of her husband's share, as is her son to be adopted. * * 啤 鞠 The defendant, Bamon Doss, answers that plaintiff can only sue for possession, when she has made an adoption, as on the part of the child adopted; or on her own part, for maintenance as widow of the deceased; and residing as she does in her brother's house, she cannot, on the strength of the permission to adopt, without proving the anoomottoe-patter, sue for possession. The other defendants answer to the same effect; and add that plaintiff declares her intention to adopt, and sets forth the to-be-adopted son's claims, notwithstanding which she comes in for her own right, in opposition to these claims—the one claim being destructive of the other. As, however, the appellants have abandoned the plea that it is a double plaint, we need only remark that it is clear to us that the plaintiff has come in on her own part, claiming the present enjoyment of the share of her deceased husband by right of succession to his estate, as his widow. 物 Juромиктом тик апонт от тн в видикттик то вов. It being contended against the plaintiff, Tarinee Debea alias Shoyamunee, that since there is such a mention, distinctly made, of authority to adopt, in her plaint before the Court, her personal right, as widow, must be taken, upon her own statement, to have lapsed,—the right vesting, from the date of her husband's death, in the boy thereafter to be adopted by her, according to the principles of Hindoo law, and specially according to the precedent in the case Bijoyah Dedea versus Shama Soondered Debea, (Sudder Dewanny Adwalut Reports of 1848, pp. 762 to 766.) we have, after a full and careful examination of the question, and with the advantage of a very protracted discussion, and of a minute examination of all the authorities, by the pleaders of the parties in this appeal, come to a conclusion differing from that of the majority, (Messrs Tucker and Hawkins,) who ruled the point in the recent decision, in the case above cited of Bijoyah Deben versus Shama Soonderee Debeah ; and are of opinion that the fact of an authority to adopt a son being possessed by a widow, does not supersede and destroy her personal rights as widow ; and that those rights ೦atipangoforce :೫ as adoption is actually made," there is no bar to the admission of the present claim by the plaintiff as widow. The subjoined extract from the decision in question shows all the grounds on which it rested. These grounds, it will be seen, are the opinion given by the pundit on the question put
- This is owneous, inamuch as, in the first place = widow. authorised to adopt a son has no heritable righ* in her late husband's estate. ßøe ante, Poosa.
94 嶽
