vystyasras páRPANA. loss to him in, that appeal, and the opinions of the pundits in Banee Kishen-munes's ease, (Reports, Susdds* Dewranny Aiawlut, vol. III. p. 828.) ' “Massrs Tuakar and Hawkins—The plaintif suns for her share of the estate as heir to her deceased son; and in her plaint sets forth that she has power from her husband, in the event of her born son's death, to adopt a son. The question was put to the pondit of this Court, whether a widow, with power from her husband to adopt a son, can sue as heir in her own right for a share of the ancestral estate? The pundit replied distinctly that she cannot. In fact, it was laid down by the psadio in the east of Ranee Kishan-mannes, appellant, oria, Rajah Woodwunt Singh and another, respondents, (p.":38, vol. III, Sudder Dewanny Adawlut Reports,) that the woment permission to a widow to adopt a son was pronounced, it had the same effect as if a child had been conceived in the womb of the widow; and her intention to adopt, under the permission, operated, to all intents and purposes, as if she were enetiate; and that the boy, subsequently adopted by her had all the rights of a posthumous child. It thus appears that the plaint in the present case cannot be sustained. The plaintiff declares she has a power to adopt; her plaint, therefore, is much the : as if she had sued as heir alleging, that another existed having a right by inheritance prior to her own.” The case of Ranee Kishen-munee, which is the other ground on which the judgment of Messrs Hawkins and Tucker proceeded, is one which turned on a point perfectly distinct from that now before us. The point in that suit was whether a retrospective right could be claimed by a son after he had been adopted, so as to bar a sale made by his adoptive mother, previous to his adoption, to the injury of the rights, # that time contingent and eventual, but which actually accrued to him upon his adoption. In that case, the son, when adopted, became an undoubted heir; and it was of course the correct doctrine that no sale, mao by a widow, who possesses only a very restricted life interest in an estate, could have been good against any ultimate heir, whether an adopted son or otherwise, unless made under circumstances of strict necessity. The case, then, stands by itself, and affords no general precedent, although, even if it did, it would relate only to the rights claimable by an adopted son, after adoption made. 傳 Now, there is no doubt as to the declared right of a widow in Bengal to อu#e6ed to her husband's estate upon his death, in default of lineal male heirs, down to the great grandson in the male line. This is a right certain and incontestable. It is not urged, on the other hand, that there is any direct text, enjoining that, in the event of the pregnancy of a widow on the death of her husband, her right to succeed shall be held in abeyance, until it be seen whether she is delivered of a male or a female child.” The argument as to a widow who has a permission to adopt, is only that, according to the dicts of the pundits, she is to be regarded as moiste. If no text can be shown for the suspension of the rights of a widow actually pregnant,” it is still more certain that there is po similar provision for divesture of right in the case of a widow, held only to be constructively pregnant of a son through the effect of a permission to adopt. S kkkk kkkLLL kAG GA AGyA AkAAA LL AAA LLL Ak kCGGGGAAA AAAA AAAA LLLLLLLLS ೬೩೪ಕ್ಷ್žಕ್ಷ್ì ಕ್ಲಿಕ್ಖ#ficಿಕ್ಖನ್ತಿ। * * * * * *_*... . . . * *. maationed that a woman sa to be pregnant can have a share, but she is to have is not in her own right, but for the behoof son to be bvrm. See ante, p. 6, mota. Digest,') is plainly
