, vyAvASTHA-DARPANA. 1870." or-ak-- saatkai-ta-tewa-manusia u takwiss - - quoted:- 常 Meenaghten's Hiros Law, volsas I. p. 2.-"The most approved conclusion appears to be that the inchoate right arising from birth, and the relinquishment by the occupant (whether effected by death or otherwise,) conjointly create this right-the inchoate right which previously existed becoming perfected by the removal of the obstaclo.”
- . Colebrooke in Strange, vol. II. p. 157.-"Presuming the property, here spoken of as thم woman's, to have been what devolved upon her by the death of her husband, and not to have been her proper stridhun, it ceased to be here at the mor് of a valid adoption, made by her, of a sou to her h d and herself; in the same manner as property, coming into the hands of a pregnant widow, by the same means, cannot be used by her at her own, after the birth of a son. From the moment of the adoption taking effect, the child became heir of the widow's husband, and the widow could have no other authority but that of mother and guardian.”t
The only means of evading the application of this opinion, so weighty and so directly to the point, has been by arguing that it was given in regard to a Madras case, and had reference to the law of the Mitákahárá.t # Dictum of the Privy Council in case of Dhurm Dău Panday versus Sham Soondree Debeak, Moore's Rep. vol. III. p. 243—“Now that, upon the authorities, there can be no doubt that that is the result of an act of adoption, because the property is in the widow from the death of the husband till the power of adoption is exercised; then, that adoption divests it from the widow, and vests it in the adopted son.”t q r A case may also be cited from the manuscript papers of Sir E. H. East, in Morley's Reports, (vol. II, p 18,) in which, incidentally, the same opinion is very strongly expressed—“Since the defendant had come to the age of 16, the widow had given up the property entirely to his management and benefit, which was a strong corroboration of the truth of the defondant's case, because the widow #erself եա actually by the adoption deprived herself of a life estate.; -- A passage in Colebrooke's Digest (vol. II. p. 505) has been referred to, in which birth is spoken of, ‘as a praticular relation of body, not a relation taking place at the first instant of procreation.” The pundit of this Court, in his first Wyavasthā in Kuroonamye's case, says: “Birth
- This definition of the cause of the hezitable right is not according to the doctrine current in Bengal-See ante, p. 5, note, * 尊 - .
+ Even if it had reference to the law as current in Bengal, it could not be鄰點 to any case and followed in practice, for the defects already stated.—See ante, pp. 1042 & 1068, notes. t This is arroneous"inasmuch as the heritable sight, if once vested in the widow, according to our law, could never be divested from her and vested in the adopted son, so as she lived or continued free from any defeci causing disinherison, or so iong as she d* not volnntariiy abandoa.—See ante, pp. 2,—u. in bove case it clearly a that, the widow having voluntarily abandoned the property, it h ಘೀ: adopted 醬 she had not so abandoned it, she could not have been divested of it, and the same vested in the adopted son, so long as she lived or continued free from any of the defects is disinherison. “How can it be certain that the plaintiff in the present case will relinquish the sty and give it up to the adopted son f 蟲蟲* rty as heir to law, then no ope ewi obligöber &o giw•it wp, she vo vagrees to do so; and the adopted son connot get :::: made to give it up; nor can a decree be made upon the belief that, she will voluntarily spanion it. The circumstances of the above case being therefore different from those of the present, it cannot be a precedent in the latter. - :
