WYAVASTHA-DARPANA, 1072 was twofold.' It might be referred to the period of ‘conception or of actual production.” In the marginal note by Mr. J. C. C. Sutherland, (a gentleman whose opinion ၀ါ points of Hindoo law is deserving of much respect,) to the case of Lukkhipria,” he has introduced the words t—"Right of succession cannot remain in abeyance in expectation of the future production of such heir, not conceived at the time of succession opened.' It has been urged that Ilindoo rules and family customs have established a period in the sixth month of pregnancy, from which conception, in a legal sense, can be calculated. These, however, are very feeble grounds; and it is obvious that the fanciful anale..., which has been contended for, between a real pregnancy, and a constructive pregnancy through a permission to adopt, will here fail; for the argument has been that the right vests in the child to be adopted from the moment that permission to adopt is pronounced by the husband, * not from the sixth month, or any other period after that. + The truth is, that the supposition of a positive and actual right, vested in an embryo, which may never come into full existence, is one which must almost be rejected on tho mere statement, of it. It is particularly repugnant to reason in the case of a possible adoption, which may be made after the lapse of many years, or may never be made at all. If the supposition were to be admitted and acted upon, the effect would be to alter the whole course of natural inheritance;t for there would be one course of inheritanee as from the son to be adopted, and another (as is usual at oresent) from the widow's husband, upon her own death. The rights, for instance, of any oughters of the huaband would, in the former case, be wholly set aside. We are, therefore, of opinion that a decree must pass in favour of plaintiff for her husband's share of the above mentioned property,f as well as for that which, it is admitted, descended from Mohadeb to his heirs, and was held by the defendant Bamun Doss.-Sudder Reports, 30th of September 1850. RextAnx.—The Court was right ın overruling the argumont that--“thc permission to one'h own wife to adopt a son is to be dealt with as the conception of a son in her womb,' as well as in rejecting the supposition of positive and actual right in an embryo which may never come into full existence; but wrong in decreeing that the widow was to have the property in her own right as heir to her husband, until she adopted a son, when divesting of her it was to vest it in the son adopted.—Almost all the rulings in the present case appear to have proceeded from the crror in one point, namely, the erroneous supposition of the widow's being divested of the right, and its being vested in the son as soon as adopted. The error in question seems to have been made originally by Mr. H. Colebrooke (from whom it was not to be expected.) We are nevertheless led to suppose that, at the time of writing the foregoing opinion, it did not occur to the • Reports, vol. V. p. 815 ; ante, p. 225. adopted, th ld be hange in th - t appear to be accurate, for, if a son be adopted, there would be no change in the ਾਂ.黑蠶 ጼ8 that case the heir of that son would succeed after him ; and if son o, ༈:༥: adopted, in such case the apprehension of the succession of the heir of such son, to the 鬣 usion of the heir of the former owner, on the ground of the decree having been made in right of t ಇಲ್ಲ: ; roundless; because, when the expected son did not at all come into existence, the roperty i. . is, must to his non-existence, exclusively belong to the heir (that is, the widow) of the original. ဥ္းခ်ဳ႕ံၿမိဳ႕ : so, in this case also, there is no ap rehension of the order of succession being changed, inasmuch as, when the adopted son did not come into existence, there could be no heir to him. t The mention of this property is not quoted here from the original docision. 輸 96
