WYAWASTEIA-DARPANA, 1082 The psadits answered, that it was perfectly unnecessary, because nothing but the desire of her ows ineland could sanction the adoption of a son by Joymouse; that without this easotion, the adoption would have been utterly void; and that, with it, the declaration would be superssons, inasmuch as the boy must necessarily be adopted as the son of the adopting widow's late isoland, and that it could not possibly be otherwise. - - - Three issues, in which the complainant Gourbullub was ordered to be plaintiff, were directed to be tried. Ist. Whether Joymonee (the widow of Moocundbullub) had authority from Moocundbullub to adopted a son ? 2nd. Whether Joynowee (the widow of Moocundbullub) did adopt Gourbullub as the son of Moocundbullub ? 3rd. Whether Rajbullub (the father of Moocundbullub) did authorise, and assent to, the adoption of a son by Joymonee ? All these issues were found in the affirmative, or in favour of the plaintiff Gourbullub. The question of Hindoo law then arose, viz. whether Gourbullub, having been so adopted, became, by his adoption, entitled to the estate of Rajbullub, his adopting grandfather—for it was admitted that he did, by his adoption, become entitled to the estate of Moocundbullub, his adopting father. - Upon this point, the two pundits of the Supreme Court dissered in opinon—one holding that Gourbullub was entitled to the estate of Moocundbullub only, the other holding that he was entitled to the estate of Moocundbullub, and the estate of Rajbullub also. The pundit who confined the right of Gourbullub to the estate of Moocundbullub, delivered to me a paper (of which the following is a copy) in justification of his opinion. “Sankha and Likhita, IIárita, Jägnyavalkya, Vishnu, Närada, and Devala, are the seven sages that have ordained that a given son, that is, an adopted son, is not an heir to kinsmen, but that he is such only to his adopting father; and Manu, Goutama, aud Boudháyana, are the three wages that have declared that he is heir to his adopting father as well as to his father's kinsmen.—In order to reconcile these contending passages, the authors and compilers of law treatises have advanced, that, where such texts occur, they intend an adopted son of transcendent merits, and as such a meritorious son cannot be found in the present (Kah) age, the author of the Dáyabiáya has placed him among those who do not inherit of kinmen. - Hence there is no disagreement between Manu and Jimúlaváhana, the author of that treatise, who, in the beginning of it, says that he has composed the work or the information of such as lose themselves in contention, from not understanding the texts of Manu and other sages, and thereby makes appear the superiority of Mans, and the utility of his own work in explaining the intent and meaning of Mans. Decisions are not formed solely by the text of Manu, because without the assistance of commentators his true meaning is not evident; otherwise why a sixth portion or a fifth portion of the share of a lawfully begotten son, awarded to a given son, is not held legal, but only a one-third share ordained him by Devala and other sages 7 It will here be observed that this Pundit has, as many Pundits before him have, relied upon the efficacy of transcendent merits, for the purpose of reconciling all differences of opinion; but as he himself has informed us, that these ‘transcendent series' are not to be found in the present (Kali) age, he has started another topia for controversy. It, as is acknowledged, transcendent merit cannot exist in the f Kali) age, it is not easy to conceive how it can, at this day, either create
