বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড)/৬৬
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| প্রেসিডেণ্ট নিক্সন- ত্রর জাতীয় নিরাপত্ত বিষয়ক উপদেষ্টা হেনরী কিসিঞ্জারের ৭ই ডিসেম্বর ’৭১-এর সাংবাদিক সম্মেলন | সিনেটর কার্যবিবরণী | ৯ ডিসেম্বর, ১৯৭১ |
[Following are excerpts from a background briefing for a news conference given on 7 December by Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security. Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona obtained the transcript from the White House and inserted it in the Congressional Record on 9 December.]
INDIA-PAKISTAN
(Background briefing with Henry A. Kissinger)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dr. Kissinger. I thought I would talk to you about how we have approached the problem in South Asia: What we have done and what has led to the number of pronouncements that have been made by official spokesmen at the U.N. in recent days.
I do not have any organized notes, so I am going to speak to you extemporaneously, and I may refer to an occasional paper just for accuracy in the question period.
First of all, let us get a number of things straight. There have been some comments that the administration is anti-Indian. This is totally inaccurate. India is a great country. It is the most populous free country. It is governed by democratic procedure.
Americans through all Administrations in the postwar period have felt a commitment to the progress and development of India, and the American people have contributed to this to the extent of $10 billion. Last year, in this Administration, India received from all sources $1.2 billion for development assistance, economic assistance, of which $700 million came from the United States in various forms. Therefore, we have a commitment to the progress and to the future of India, and we have always recognized that the success of India, and the Indian democratic experiment, would be of profound significance to many of the countries in the underdeveloped world.
Therefore, when we have differed with India, as we have in recent weeks we do so with great sadness and with great disappointments.
Now let me describe the situation as we saw it going back to March 25". March 25th is, of course, the day when the central government of Pakistan decided to establish military rule in East Bengal and started the process which has led to the present situation.
The United States has never supported the particular action that let to this tragic series of events, and the United States has always recognized that this action had consequences which had a considerable impact on India. We have always recognized that the influx of refugees into India produced the danger of communal strife in a country always precariously poised on the edge of communal strife. We have known that it is a strain on the already scarce economic resources of a country in the process of development.
Therefore, from the beginning the United States has played a very active role in attempting to ease the suffering of the refugees and the impact on India of the large influx of unexpected people. The United States position has been to attempt two efforts simultaneously: One, to ease the human suffering and to bring about the return of the refugees; and secondly, we have attempted to bring about a political resolution of the conflict which generated the refugees in the first place.
One of the difficulties has been that the time required to bring about a political evolution is somewhat longer than what is needed to be done immediately to bring about and easing of human suffering.
There were two aspects to the refugee problem; One, taking care of the refugees that were inside India; and secondly, to avert condition inside East Pakistan that would generate more refugees, particularly to ease famine conditions. We committed $90 million for the support of the refugees in India and $155 million to avert famine in East Pakistan, which is more than the rest of, the world has done combined.
I might add that the some; that have been devoted to averting famine in East Pakistan have been contributed at the specific request of the Indian Government, which was concerned that there would be another major outflow of refugees which would make their problem totally unmanageable.
The President has requested Congress, in the present AID appropriation, for an additional $250 million to continue this work, and this is in addition to food shipments which we were prepared to make. In other words, the United States has contributed $500 million for the relief of refugees and to ease suffering in India, and to prevent more refugees from coming into India.
The United States also financed the chartering of 26 vessels to increase their capacity to transport grain from ocean ports into the interior of East Pakistan........
Now, the United States did not condone what happened in March 1971: on the contrary, the United States has made no new development loans to Pakistan since March 1971.
Secondly, there has been a great deal of talk about military supplies to Pakistan. The fact of the matter is that immediately after the actions in East Pakistan at the end of March of this past Year, the United States suspended any new licenses. It stepped the shipment of all military supplies out of American depots or that were under American governmental control. The only arms that were continued to be shipped to Pakistan were arms on old licenses in commercial channels, and those were spare parts. There were no lethal end-items involved.
To give you a sense of the magnitude, the United States cut off $35 million worth of arms at the end of March of this year, or early April of this year, immediately after the actions in East Bengal, and continued to ship something less than $5 million worth; whereupon, all the remainder on the pipeline was cut off In other words, when one is. reading some of the commentaries, the impression is created that we were equipping four armored divisions. The fact of the matter is that $35 million worth of arms were cut off immediately, and the only thing that was continued to be shipped was something less than $5 million-I don't have the precise figure; I think it is between $4 and $5 million-of spare parts that were in commercial channels under existing licenses.
So I behave it is correct to say that the United States, by its actions, took a stand, staring in March of this year; and that the United States did indicate, through its performance, what evolution it wanted to take that the United States has made a greater contribution than the rest of the world combined to ease the suffering in India and Pakistan, but especially the suffering generated by the actions of the end of March.
Now, then, we come to the problem of political evolution. What has the United States done in this respect?
It is true the United States did not make any public declarations on its views of the evolution, because the United States wanted to use its influence with both Delhi and Islamabad to bring about a political settlement that would enable the refugees to return. At the request of the President, this was explained by me to the Indian Foreign Minister and to the Indian Prime Minister when I was in New Delhi in early July, and both indicated that they understood our decision in this respect and made no criticism of our decision.
They did make a criticism of the arms shipments. Secondly, we consistently used our influence that we gained in this manner to urge the Government of Pakistan in the direction of a political evolution. We urged the Government of Pakistan and they agreed that relief supplies be distributed by international agencies, in order to take away the criticism in East Pakistan that they might be used to strengthen the central authority, and the Government agreed that a timetable be established for returning Pakistan to civilian rule. That was supposed to be done by the end of December.
We urged a mutual withdrawal of troops from the border, and when India rejected this, we urged a unilateral withdrawal of Pakistan troops from the border, and that was accepted by Pakistan and never replied to by India.
We urged an amnesty for all refugees, and that was accepted.
Q. By whom?
DR. KISSINGER. By Pakistan. There are no refugees from India in Pakistan.
We urged Pakistan to extend an amnesty to all refugees so that they could return without fear of reprisals.
We went further. We established contact with the Bangladesh people in Calcutta, and during August, September and October of this year no fewer than eight such contacts took place.
We approached President Yahya Khan three times in order to begin negotiations with the Bangladesh people in Calcutta. The Government of Pakistan accepted. We were told by our contacts in Calcutta that the Indian Government discouraged such negotiations. In other words, we attempted to promote a political settlement, and if I can sum up the difference that may have existed between us and the Government of India, it was this:
We told the Government of India on many occasions—the Secretary of State saw the Indian Ambassador 18 times; I saw him seven times since the end of August on behalf of the President. We all said that political autonomy for East Bengal was the inevitable outcome of a political evolution, and that we favoured it. The difference may have been that the Government of India wanted things so rapidly that it was no longer talking about political evolution, but about political collapse.
Without attempting to speculate on the motives of the Indian Government, the fact of the matter, as they presented themselves to us was as follows; We told the Indian Prime Minister when she was here of the Pakistan offer to withdraw their troops unilaterally from the border. There was no response.
We told the Indian Prime Minister when she was here that we would try to arrange negotiations between the Pakistanis and members of the Awami League, specifically approved by Mujibur, who is in prison. We told the Indian Ambassador shortly before his return to India that we were prepared even to discuss with them a political timetable, a precise timetable for the establishment of political autonomy in East Bengal. That conversation was held on November 19". On November 22", military action started in East Bengal.
We told the Pakistan Foreign Secretary when he was here that it was desirable on November 15th; that we thought it was time for Pakistan to develop a maximum program. He said he could not give us an answer until the week of November 22nd when he would return to his country. He also pointed out to us that there would be a return to civilian rule at the end of December, at which time it might be easier to bring about such matters as the release of Mujibur, whose imprisonment had occurred under military rule.
This information was transmitted, and military action, nevertheless, started during the week of November 22". So when we say that there was no need for military action, we do not say that India did not suffer. We do not say that we are unsympathetic to India's problems or that we do not value India.
This country, which in many respects has had a love affair with India, can only, with enormous pain, accept the fact that military action was taken in our view without adequate cause, and if we express this opinion in the United Nations, we do not do so because: we want to support one particular point of view on the subcontinent, or because we want to forego our friendship with what will always be one of the great countries in the world; but because we believe that if, as some of the phrases go, the right of military attack is determined by arithmetic, if political wisdom consists of saying the attacker has 500 million, and the defender has 100 million, and, therefore, the United States must always be on the side of the numerically stronger, then we are creating a situation where, in the foreseeable future, we will have international anarchy, and where the period of peace, which is the greatest desire for the President to establish, will be jeopardized; not at first for Americans, necessarily, but for peoples all over the world. I have taken the liberty of coming in here to explain our point of view. You can see the necessity for a background basis, because there have been misconceptions of what we have done and of our motives. I have given you extemporaneously this brief sketch, and now I will be glad to answer any questions, or to go into more detail.
Q. Why was the first semi-public explanation of the American position one of condemning India, and why this belated explanation that you are now giving? The perception of the world is that the United States regards India as an aggressor; that it is anti-India, and you make a fairly persuasive case here that that is not the case. So why this late date?
DR. KISSINGER. This is the highest praise I have ever had from Peter Lisagor, (Laughter)
We were reluctant to believe for a long time that the matter had come down to a naked recourse to force, and we were attempting for the first two weeks of the military operations to see what could be done to quiet it through personal diplomacy conducted by the Department of State.
We made two appeals to the Indian Prime Minister. We appealed also to the Pakistan President, and we appealed also to the Soviet Union!
Now, then, on Friday the situation burst into full-blown war and it was decided to put the facts before the public. Now, I cannot, of course, accept the characterization that you made of the way these facts were put forward; that, they were put forward as anti-Indian.
Q. I said the perception of the world public was that the United States was anti Indian because of the nature of that first background briefing at the State Department on Friday.
DR, KISSINGER. We are opposed to the use of military force in this crisis, and we do not believe that it was necessary to engage in military action. We believe that what started as a tragedy in East Bengal is now becoming an attempt to dismember a sovereign state and a member of the United Nations,
So the view that was expressed on Saturday is not inconsistent with the view that is expressed today. What was done today is an explanation of the background that led to the statement on Saturday, and it might have been better if we had put the whole case forward.
Q. If I understand what you said, you said prior to the outbreak of full-scale hostilities between India and Pakistan that the Pakistani Government had assured the United States that it was going to take a number of steps, including return to civilian rule by the end of this month, to enter into negotiations with the Bangladesh representatives operating in Calcutta, to withdraw its troops from the borders unilaterally. Do you know at this point whether any of those commitments by the Pakistani Government still stand? If the war can be stopped some way, are they still willing to do all those things?
DR, KISSINGER. In fairness, let me put these into perspective these various things. The unilateral withdrawal, that was without any qualifications. The willingness to talk to the Bangladesh people involved a disagreement between the Indians and the Bangladesh on the one side, and the Pakistanis on the other. The Indians took the view that the negotiations had to begin with Mujibur, who was in prison.
What we attempted to promote was a negotiation with Bangladesh people who were not in prison, and who were in Calcutta. The Pakistanis said they would talk only to those Bangladesh people who were not charged with any particular crime in Pakistan, and I don't know whom that would have excluded.
But I think that part, of it was not the breakdown. What created the major difference between us-not us so much, because we were not a party; we were just transmitting information-between those who wanted to get negotiations started and the Indian side, was that the Indians took the view that the negotiations had to begin with Mujibur.
Let me go off the record here for a minute.
We took the view that once negotiations started, the release of Mujibur would be an inevitable consequence after some period of time, and, therefore, we felt that the most important thing was to get the negotiations started.
This part I consider off the record. It is supply for your understanding. I think it is safe to say the Indian side wanted a maximum of rapidity, and perhaps more speed than the Pakistan political process would stand. We were urging movement at the greatest speed that the Pakistan political process could stand. We felt that one way to resolve this would be for the Indians to give us a time-table of what they would consider a reasonable time-table, and this was raised fust when I was there in the Summer, and received no clear reply. It was raised again with the Indian Ambassador just before he left, and it was not answered.
So we never got a concrete expression of what the difference in time was, They knew that we believed that political autonomy was the logical outcome of a negotiation. Do these offers still stand? I don'ts know,. (End off the record.)
We would be prepared, certainly from our side, if the fighting stopped and there were a withdrawal of forces, if anything, to redouble our efforts to move matters in the direction in which I have indicated.
Q. Is it a fact that two other factors that you did not deal with in your opening remarks here were also major causes in your and the President accepting India as an aggressor-that is, accusing India as an aggressor-the fact that (1) to do otherwise might lead to a collapse of the President's trip to China and the often stated in print personal preference of the President and you for General Khan over what were considered to be the unrealistic leaders in New Delhi?
DR, KISSINGER. With respect to the first question, we do not have the impression that the Peoples Republic of China considers agreement with us a prerequisite for a successful visit on other issues in the United Nations, and, therefore, we do not consider that the People Republic of China has a veto over our policies. In short, our policy has been consistent. We have told the Indian Government all summer long that we want or favored political evolution leading toward autonomy; and secondly, that we were opposed to the use of military force, and we did this quite independent of what the Chinese views might be. We had no advance information of what position the Chinese would take at the United Nations, and we operated quite independently.
Secondly, speaking first about myself, the first time I visited the Indian subcontinent I was the subject, in 1962, as can easily be checked in newspaper files, to the most violent newspaper criticisms in Pakistan' for my allegedly Harvard produced preference for Indians, and so much so that I even suggested that I might cance] my visit to Pakistan.
There is no personal preference on my part for Pakistan, and the views that I expressed at the beginning, of the American position-that is, about the crucial importance of India as a country in the world and in the subcontinent-have always been strongly held by me, and I, therefore, enthusiastically support those as an expression of bipartisan American policy in the postwar period.
As for the President, I was not aware of his preference for Pakistan leaders over Indian leaders, and I, therefore, asked him this morning what this might be based on. He pointed out-as you know, I was not acquainted with the President before his present position-but he pointed out to me that on his trip in 1967, he was received very warmly by the Prime Minister and by the President of India; that the reports that he was snubbed at any point are without any foundation, and that in any event, the warmth of the reception that we extended to the Indian Prime Minister two weeks before the attacks on Pakistan started should make clear what enormous value we attach to Indian friendship.
While I can understand that there can be sincere differences of opinion about the wise course to take. I do not think we do ourselves any justice if we ascribe policies to the personal pique of individuals. Besides, the charge of aggression was not made in this building in the first place.
Q. Was there a failure of understanding between the President and the Prime Minister when she was here last month; a failure of understanding of what this country wanted and what she was planning to do?
Dr. KISSINGER. We explained to the Indian leaders, the President did and so did the Secretary of State, exactly what our position was. We pointed out the offers that had been made. We were not given any reply to the offers, and we were not given the slightest inkling that such a military operation was in any way imminent; indeed, in the interval between her departure and the beginning of military operations, we did three things:
One, we attempted to promote these negotiations between the government in Islamabad and Bangladesh representatives approved by Mujibur. We did not get the agreement of the government in Islamabad, at the time the war had broken out, to that procedure. I am just saying what we were trying to do.
Secondly, we urged very strenuously on the Pakistan Foreign Secretary when he was here that the greatest possible number of concessions that could be make were urgently required and we were promised an answer, as it turned out, for the week that the military attacks took place.
Thirdly, and I did not mention this before, we had the approval of the Government of Pakistan to establish contact with Mujibur through his defense lawyer. All of these facts were communicated to the Indian Government, and nevertheless, military attacks took place.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to ask you a clarifying question about some thing you said just a moment ago.
You said that the charge of aggression was not made in this building. Two questions about that. One,—
Dr. KISSINGER. We do not disagree with it, but it was in reference to a point that the President and I have an anti-Indian bias.
Q. Does this carry the implication that you are putting the responsibility for that original charge of aggression on the State Department? That is my first question.
Dr. KISSINGER No. There is a united governmental view on it.
Q. Secondly, I am still trying to clarify the question in Mr. Lisagor's mind and others, Mr. Ziegler did say in Florida on Saturday that India had engaged in a massive military action and he used the word “massive" which sounds like this building to us.
Dr. KISSINGER, Sounds like a what?
Q. Like a charge of aggression from this building, to me, at least.
Dr. KISSINGER. We don't disagree with it. I was trying to explain that this was not a personal idiosyncrasy. The phrase “massive military action" that Ron Ziegler used was a quote from an official Indian statement saying, that massive military operations have begun in East Pakistan and Ron was simply referring to the quote from the Indian officials' statement.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, would you clarify the situation on the negotiations between the Islamabad Government and Bangladesh? How much did they agree to do? I seem to be totally confused on what you said. Did the Government agree to negotiate with Bangladesh representatives approved by Mujibur?
Dr. KISSINGER. No. That was a point which we were still trying to get accomplished. They had said they would consider it. They had agreed to talk to Bangladesh representatives,
Q. Why, then, were you so certain that the results of these negotiations for which apparently you had no assurances would end in autonomy?
Dr. KISSINGER. Wait a minute. We had assurances for negotiations between the Bangladesh people and Islamabad. We did not have assurances yet that Mujibur would select the negotiator. Q. What, then, was the basis of your belief that the result of these negotiations would in fact be autonomy for East Pakistan?
Dr. KISSINGER. I did not say that this would in fact be the case. I said that we had said we would support this, that we would use our influence in Pakistan to help bring this about and that we were willing to listen to a specific time-table.
Q. I thought you said that-
Dr. KISSINGER. I said it was our personal judgment; that could not be proved, and it was off the record, that it was likely that once negotiations started and were showing some progress that it would lead to the release of Mujibur, but we don't insist on this.
Q. I thought you said it was inevitable.
Dr. KISSINGER. I said off the record, that it was our judgment that the inevitable outcome would be political autonomy for East Pakistan and we had talked in this sense to the Government of Pakistan and they had in fact proclaimed that they were prepared to grant political autonomy for everything but foreign policy, defense, and currency, I believe.
Q. We have been very much involved in the negotiations, from what you say.
Dr. KISSINGER. Not on substance.
Q. Not on substance? Autonomy for East Pakistan, et cetra?
Dr. KISSINGER. Well, the negotiations had never, in fact, started.
Q. Well, in arranging them. The question I really have is: Today there is a report that Yahya Khan has called for assistance from East Pakistan in forming a coalition government. Is this in accordance with the path we were following and our goals? Did we approve this and is it encouraging in any way?
Dr. KISSINGER. We cannot accept the position that we are responsible for every detail of this negotiation. We, in general, have encouraged the return to civilian government. I do not want to go into the details of the political moves that are now being made. We were not in the position where we were taking responsibility, as a country, for every move in this negotiation. I was simply trying to explain; one, that we did show humanitarian concern, two, that we did take action at the end of March with respect to the East Bengal situation, three, that we did try to bring about the political conditions in East Pakistan that would make it possible for refugees to return.
The details of the negotiations would have had to be between Islamabad and the Bangladesh and whether one particular government or another is the right mix is a detail into which we cannot go, particularly since I have not studied this now.
Q. May I follow that up? Were we then actually attempting to play the same role in South Asia as we have attempted to play in the Middle East, that of an honest broker? Is that what you are telling us? Dr. KISSINGER. We were attempting to promote a political evolution which would make recourse to war unnecessary. We recognized that India had a major problem. We recognized that the conditions in East Bengal made it difficult for the refugees to return and we tried for humanitarian and other reasons and in order to preserve the peace, to bring about a humane and peaceful solution.
What we are saying now and whit we said on Saturday was that the peaceful means had not been exhausted and that in the circumstances that existed on November 22 and November 29, the use of military force was not justified. That is the basis for our position and that has nothing to do with any preference for one country or another, It has to do with the impact on the peace of the world of such matters.
Q. Is it your judgment that the Indians were never interested solely in political autonomy for Bangladesh, but wanted this—
Dr. KISSINGER. I cannot speculate on this. We have certainly told them from the beginning what we were willing to do and I don't want to speculate on that,
Q. Regardless of who was to blame for the breakdown in negotiations you referred to, do you and the President feel personally that India is the sole aggressor in the current outbreak of hostilities?
Dr. KISSINGER. I can only repeat-I don't want to use emotionally charged wordswe are saying that military action was not justified. We are saying that there should be a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces, after which the political evolution which we have described should be addressed with even greater vigor than before.
Q. Henry, what explanation, if any, have we received in the United States from India as to why it did resort to military action?
Dr. KISSINGER. We have received no explanation.
Q. Henry, in the beginning you talked about using our political influence with the Pakistanis as one of the reasons why we did not do anything in public; we were working privately. Can you give us any concrete illustration of where that private political influence was successful, other than promises which were either not kept or impossible to keep because of the problem that occurred subsequently?
Dr. KISSINGER. Now, wait a minute, we are not talking about promises that
We..... kept. Let me mention a few of the ... that had been accomplished since May, - - - - - - - - - - - The fact that all of the relief supplies, the relief supplies in East Pakistan, were distributed through international agencies; the announcement of a time-table for the return to civilian rule; the replacement of the military governor who had been in charge at the time that the Pakistan Army moved in at the end of March; the replacement of that military governor in East Pakistan and the establishment of a civilian governor; the declaration of amnesty; the willingness to talk to Bangladesh representative, even if there might have been some dispute about who they were, it never even reached that point because the thing aborted before candidates for the negotiations were ever presented by the Bangladesh people or rejected by the Pakistanis. They never rejected anybody, The willingness to let us establish contact with Mujibur by talking to his defense attorney; the indication that substantial political autonomy would be granted to East Pakistanall of these, I am not saying they did them only because we urged them, but it is true that they were always done after we urged them.
But I don't want to speak for the Pakistan Government and claim that everything they did was as a result of our urging, but all of these action I have mentioned occurred after we recommended them.
Q. Do you feel that Madam Gandhi betrayed us?
Dr. KISSINGER I would not use such words.
Q. Did she give any indication that she would seek a peaceful solution and instead do something else?
Dr. KISSINGER. All I can say is we had no reason to believe that military action was that imminent and that we did not have some time to begin to work on a peaceful resolution.
Let me make it clear, we recognize that there was not an unlimited period of time, but it seemed to us that either they could have given us a timetable or one could have waited for the return to civilian rule which was only three week away, to see whether that would bring about a change in the situation by bringing to the forefront individuals less intimately connected with the events that brought about the difficulties.
Q. Henry, you said earlier that we have had contact with the Soviet Union, consultations with them on the problems there. Were they aware of our actions and the progress and the hopeful circumstances as time went along, from March up until the shooting started Friday?
Dr. KISSINGER. I think they were generally aware.
Q. Were they kept aware?
Dr. KISSINGER. Well, maybe not of every last move, but I think they were aware of our general approach.
Q. What was their attitude as far as it was given to us, can you tell us?
Dr. KISSINGER. They took a formal “hands-off attitude which may or may not have had the practical consequence of at least not discouraging what happened.
Q. What impact do you think the crisis will have on our relations with the Soviet Union now? Do you think it might have an impact on the President's trip to Moscow, for example?
Dr. KISSINGER. We believe that the basis of a peaceful evolution with the Soviet Union requires that both countries exercise great restraint in the many crisis areas around the world and that they both subordinate short-term advantages to the long term interests of peace. We certainly are making a great effort. We may not always succeed but we are making an effort to approach problems everywhere, including in South Asia, with this attitude. As I have pointed out in innumerable backgrounders, the attempt to achieve unilateral advantage sooner or later will lead to an escalation of tensions which must jeopardize the prospects of relaxation. We hope that the Soviet Union will use its undoubted influence to approach problems in the sub-continent in the same spirit and not to jeopardize the very hopeful evolution that has started by a short-term approach, but we are still waiting to see. We have no judgment yet.
Q. Is it a proper role for a great nation which has maintained a posture of impartiality in South Asia for about 25 years now to take a side or to appear to take a side in this present crisis?
Dr. KISSINGER. Well, we have attempted to alleviate the suffering and we have attempted to be true to our principles of giving people an opportunity to determine their political future, but we have not done it in a pressing way. We have done it in an attempt to preserve the peace with the approval of both sides. With respect to the immediate issue which is before the United Nations, we have an obligation to make clear for the sake of peace that we do not favor recourse to military forces as a member of the United Nations, and as one of the principal countries in the world.
So, you have to separate, Peter, our attitude towards the overall problem from our attitude towards the immediate problem. On the immediate problem the facts are that, one, the vote in the Security Council has been 11 to 2. There were only two countries against our position-the Soviet Union and Poland. Eleven other countries supported our position. It is not our position. It is not a quarrel between us and India. It is our attempt to make clear to the world community that we do stand for a peaceful resolution of disputes, and it would be wrong to say one side hits 600 million, and whoever has the power to settle disputes by force should do it. That would lead to international anarchy.
So what was said on Saturday refers to the military actions that are no taking place, and what was said today was to put our overall attitude in its right perspective...
The Press, thank you.